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NARRATIVE AND THEORY: FORMALISM’S
RECURRENT RETURN
By SAHIB SINGH*
INTRODUCTION
Disciplines do not always appreciate being interrogated. International
law’s recent history might suggest that it is a little more liberal in this
regard. The rise of intellectual projects that seek to question the discip-
line’s assumptions, preferences and processes of professional knowledge
production, has been a hallmark development since the late 1980s. And
yet, as such critical projects have since proliferated and become sub-
sumed – accepted by the discipline on its own terms – there has been
another casualty. This is the near loss of a critical posture. What seemed
relegated, perhaps marginalised, is the willingness to think about how we
think (reflexivity) and to self-consciously practice this process to one’s
own theories and ideas (i.e. self-reflexivity). This state of affairs condi-
tions current international legal theory. To combat this, I turn to narra-
tive analysis as a critical method; a move that has the express purpose of
engendering a specific form of responsibility in how ideas are expressed
and understood within the discipline. This project is however distinct
from current approaches in critical legal theory. I speak of a responsi-
bility attached to those who attend to theory, concerned not only with
making explicit the personal or cultural biases of the theorist, but also
with making explicit how a theory constrains, is made to seem necessary,
and how it imposes limits on our world view. Narrative analysis may be
of considerable use in engendering such an ethic. Here, I chose to
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employ this method on a type of normative international legal theory that
eschews reflexivity: contemporary formalism, specifically its Hartian
variant, as outlined in Jean d’Aspremont’s recent book Formalism and
the Sources of International Law (FSIL).1
Formalism has always held a privileged place in European interna-
tional legal thinking. Its return to define contemporary debates within
the discipline is a complex affair, but a consistent thread is the attempt to
recapture the relative autonomy of the international legal discipline.2 It is
within this disciplinary moment that d’Aspremont’s monograph
emerges. This formalism is not an innocent theory, but intensely polit-
ical in two distinct senses. First, it is a political position that situates itself
in the drama of disciplinary governance: it is being used to sustain
disciplinary autonomy. It has been deployed as the foundations of a
contemporary culture of European resistance to empire. Second, it is
imbued with specific biases because the contours of the theory are con-
structed and prefigured. Various forms of contemporary formalism
anchor law’s claim to autonomy in ‘social practice’, ‘hermeneutic tech-
niques’, ‘interpretive craft’, ‘argumentative practice’ or even ‘style’. But
such conceptual apparatuses, naturalised precisely because they often
seem obvious, are made to seem necessary, interpreted and filled in a
constitutive act by a theorist. Both aspects of the political will be ad-
dressed in this article, and both attend to the question of reflexivity.
d’Aspremont’s thesis is simple: how we ascertain the sources of inter-
national law ought to be a formalised process – it ought to be done by
grounding them in the social practice of a wide-range of law-applying
authorities. This is a thesis, not a general theory of international law (8).
At its core, it is the application of the HLA Hart’s jurisprudence to the
sources of international law. Most of the book, however, is dedicated to
opening up the conceptual space for this thesis. It is this exercise in
demarcation that allows d’Aspremont to make claims on how other the-
ories may or may not be relevant. This is done through various strategies
of persuasion and specific aesthetic choices. More importantly, the per-
suasiveness and necessity of d’Aspremont’s thesis owes a great deal to his
1 J d’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law: A Theory of the Ascertainment
of Legal Rules (OUP 2011). Page numbers of the book are referenced in parenthesis throughout this
article.
2 A selection of work includes: M Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and
Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (CUP 2001), 474-494; M Koskenniemi, ‘Miserable Comforters:
International Relations as New Natural Law’, (2009) 15 European Journal of International Relations
395; J Klabbers, ‘The Relative Autonomy of International Law or the Forgotten Politics of
Interdisciplinarity’, (2004) 1 Journal of International Law and International Relations 35; J
Klabbers, ‘Bridge Crack’d: A Critical Look at Interdisciplinary Relations’, (2009) 23
International Relations 119; J Crawford, ‘International Law as a Discipline and Profession’,
(2012) 106 ASIL Proc 471; J Crawford, ‘Chance, Order, Change: The Course of International
Law, General Course on Public International Law’, (2013) 365 Recueil des Cours de l’Acade´mie
de Droit International 9. For a critical commentary of this formalism see, S Singh, ‘A Nostalgia for
Autonomy’ in A Nollkaemper, W Werner and J d’Aspremont (eds.), International Law as a
Profession (CUP 2015 forthcoming).
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conceptual framework. It is the interrelated functioning of these two
aspects of his monograph – how it sets the scene for a Hartian thesis
on sources and the content of this thesis – that make it an apt text to
explore how ideas are ‘produced’, ‘sold’ and ‘consumed’.
This form allows d’Aspremont to make a mild, but important, inter-
vention in the disciplinary discourse of international law. Mild because it
acts as a gentle reminder that when we talk about what international law
is, we must speak specifically of law – and not of economics, history, or
philosophy – as grounded in identifiable rules and social facts. Important
because it is representative of a mainstream realist approach to a specific
disciplinary moment, where formalism is being used to resist deforma-
lisation, empire and disciplinary colonisation.3 d’Aspremont’s FSILmay
not subscribe to each of these political agendas, but it cannot operate or
be understood in complete absence of them. It does not emerge, after all,
in a vacuum. The politics of its theory are better understood once FSIL
is placed in relation to the other works of the author (on international
legal positivism and epistemology),4 in relation to and as part of a net-
work of other texts in the discursive field,5 and in given historical and
political contexts. In short, the meaning of d’Aspremont’s narrative
emerges from both what is said and what is not said,6 from inside the
text and outside of it, from both its form and its content.
In offering this account, I will first explore the contours of what it
means to embrace narrative analysis as a critical method (Part I). This
entails ordering the concepts around which this method functions, the
politics behind this choice of method at this historical juncture and for
the purpose of analysing the present text, and the enduring value it can
have for how we think about ideas. The remainder of the article then
applies narrative analysis to d’Aspremont’s text. The ground covered is
vast: from the pathological desire for coherence and its intimacy with the
politics of method and the promise of progress (Part II), to the discip-
line’s politics as conditioning FSIL’s production and reception (Part
III), and finally the arrested and unstated ideology that grounds
d’Aspremont’s Hartian method (Part IV). I aim to examine how specific
strategies, concepts and conditions structure both the conceptual space
around d’Aspremont’s thesis and its content. The article concludes that
it is the form of a theory that influences the legal mind, more than the
substance of its claims. This must be appreciated if one is to grasp the
intimate connection between ideas, imagination and action.
3 These are further explored in Singh, A Nostalgia for Autonomy.
4 J d’Aspremont and J Kammerhofer, International Legal Positivism in a Post-modern World
(CUP 2014); J. d’Aspremont, ‘Reductionist Legal Positivism and International Law’, (2012) 106
ASIL Proc 368; J d’Aspremont, ‘Wording in International Law’, (2012) 25 LJIL 575.
5 M Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (A Sheridan Smith (trans.), Routledge, Abingdon
2011), 25-6.
6 M Foucault, ‘Le discours ne droit pas eˆtre pris comme . . .’ in M Foucault, Dits et e´crits (Vol.
III), 1976-79 (Gallimard, Paris 1994) 123.
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I. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS AS A CRITICAL METHOD IN LEGAL THEORY
Roland Barthes once observed that narrative ‘is present at all times, in all
places, in all societies; indeed narrative starts the very history of
mankind . . .Like life itself, it is there, international, transhistorical,
transcultural.’7 Narratives, then, are not only seemingly inescapable, in
Barthes sense, but they are how we make sense of the world. They allow
us to understand, explain and act within it.8 Narrative analysis is an
analytical method that has been applied across a number of disciplines
in recent years.9 Its methodological moorings, however, lie predomin-
antly in literary criticism and historical theory.10 Here, I draw upon the
insights of these intellectual fields, but am careful to sustain the parti-
cularities of international legal theory.11 In this vein such theories are
stories that let us see, and simultaneously hide, different worlds – all the
while constituting us, the limits and potential of our imagination, and the
law. To understand legal theories as narratives both opens up a specific
set of questions and imports a bedevilled intellectual history.12 It re-
quires us to ask both what knowledge a legal theory or project produces
(which actors, political projects and biases are foregrounded) and how it
produces this knowledge. It is only the latter that concerns me here.
The dominance of an idea depends on both the material factors that
sustain it (e.g. its prevalence in the university, the provision of research
funding grants, its usefulness to institutions of practice etc.) and the
theory’s form. The task in regards the latter is to ask and to demonstrate
7 R Barthes, ‘An Introduction to a Structural Analysis of Narrative’, (1975) 6 New Literary
History 237, 237.
8 See also, F Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act
(Routledge, Abingdon 2002), xiii (‘the all-informing process of narrative, which I take to be (here
using the shorthand of philosophical idealism), the central function or instance of the human mind.’).
9 See, J Phelan and P Rabinowitz (eds.), A Companion to Narrative Theory (Blackwell
Publishing, Oxford 2005) 1-17.
10 Particular influences are: N Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton University
Press 1957); Jameson, The Political Unconscious; P Macherey, A Theory of Literary Production (G
Wall (trans.), Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1978) (all are concerned with narrative as used in
literary criticism). Also see, HWhite,Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century
Europe (The Johns Hopkins University Press 1975); H White, The Content of Form: Narrative
Discourse and Historical Representation (The John Hopkins University Press 1990); and H White,
The Fiction of Narrative: Essays on History, Literature and Theory 1957-2007 (R. Doran (ed.), The
Johns Hopkins University Press 2010).
11 At the outset there is a difference in claimed functions of narrative in these fields. In literature,
narrative moves in the realm of the fictive, of the figurative and of art; meaning is produced by
allusions to reality. Historical work, in contrast, claims to explain past events, structures and process
by representing them in narrative form. Narrative produces meaning in the former in its move from
non-reality towards reality, and the converse is true for the latter. International legal theory requires
the approach in each of these fields. Most legal theories begin from claims to reality, of both present
and past, before moving towards a plausible fictive vision for the future of this same world; this
movement and a legal theory’s normative destination are both premised upon and configured by
certain allusions to reality, as well as the claimed reality from which the theory initially emerged.
12 H White, ‘The Question of Narrative in Contemporary Historical Theory’ in H White (ed.),
The Content of Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (The Johns Hopkins
University Press 1990) 26-57.
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how a theory asserts its logic, how its conceptual apparatus and its utopia
are constructed to appeal to our desires and intuitions, and how it – as a
way of thinking about and understanding the world – becomes en-
grained, unconsciously assumed and/or embedded within our culture.
To cognise the role that theories can and do play in constraining and/
or enabling our imagination, how they construct us just as they construct
the law, strikes me as a task of some urgency. And whilst becoming self-
conscious of this is a necessary first step, to practice theory with reflex-
ivity, and hence responsibility, is the next.
Legal theories are stories: they are varying perspectives on what the
law is, its past and its potential futures, to say nothing of what they say or
presume of the social world. As narratives they are part history, part
method and part ideology. When analysed as such, sufficient regard
must be had to their form, whether poem, novel, speech, academic
text, or other narrative forms. The content of the form shapes how a
theory, or narrative, persuades. Here, I apply three broad principles of
narrative analysis to a series of contemporary texts related to Hartian
positivism.
First, narrative analysis does not seek to explain the text anew, or to
discover its hidden meaning, or to simply dismantle the text in order to
replace it with a demonstration of how it really produces meaning.13 It
eschews the mindset and method of those claiming ‘rightness’,14 i.e. an
authoritative interpretation of the text or law. Perhaps its politics, in this
regard, is to demonstrate an epistemological rupture with the ruling
rationalities in the social sciences (economics and science), as well as
with the prevailing view in international legal disciplinary culture. To
relinquish the perception that one can discover the true meaning of the
text comes with the recognition that a narrative can and does produce a
multiplicity of meanings. How a text mediates between these meanings
provides an insight into how it may work on our imagination.15 A ‘nar-
rative compels precisely because it seems that it might have been
different.’16
Second, narrative analysis embraces the complexity of the text; it does
not reduce it to the intentions and choices of the author nor to any
structuring models or visions of the world (law) that it may adopt, even
if it does consciously highlight each of these. Instead, it recognises that a
legal theory is comprised of the relationships between each of its compo-
nent parts – its concepts, illusions and aesthetics. Each produces mean-
ings in different ways; some appealing to and gaining their legitimacy
13 Macherey, A Theory of Literary Production, 76-77.
14 The idea of ‘rightness’ is embedded within legal culture; see D Kennedy, A Critique of
Adjudication {fin de sie`cle} (Harvard University Press 1998) 364-368.
15 P Ricoeur, ‘Existence and Hermeneutics’ in C Reagen and D Stewart (eds.), The Philosophy of
Paul Ricoeur: An Anthology of his Work (Beacon Press, Boston 1978) 97, 98.
16 Macherey, A Theory of Literary Production, 47. For a similar sentiment in regards the his-
toriography of international law see, Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer, 5.
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beyond the text, as well as through concrete, if contested, definition (e.g.
concepts), whilst others can only take on different meanings depending
on how they are deployed within the text (e.g. images, meaning illusive
visions of the world). The relationships, and kinds of relationships, be-
tween these elements of a legal theory delineate the text’s meaning(s) and
hence its imaginative power. These relationships reflect the text’s stra-
tegies and the author’s narrative tactics, but they are not determined by
the author’s choice, or by various structures that infuse the text, such as
emplotment (tragedy, comedy, satire, romance etc.) or linguistic protocol
(metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, irony etc.).17 Each of these may
place constraints and possibilities for meaning on a text, but a legal the-
ory’s concepts, illusions and aesthetics take on new meanings and pos-
sibilities as they are set to work within the text and in the act of reading.
Narrative analysis, as used here, does bring a stringent focus onto the
conceptual strategies, narrative tactics and other epistemological and aes-
thetic choices made by d’Aspremont, but it does not place an undue and
unjust burden on them. It resists simplifying the meaning and know-
ledge of the theoretical text to the intentions of its author, or to the
visions of the world he a priori subscribes to and the meaning this
imports.
Third and finally, narrative analysis seeks to look beyond a legal
theory text’s apparent coherence and unity, its apparent self-suffi-
ciency,18 rather seeking to highlight and then breach its ‘strategies of
containment’.19 Critical narrative analysis must go beyond the legal the-
oretical text in order to remain loyal to it. It must recognise the text is
influenced by the nature and problems of the individual author’s exist-
ence and functions. This is arguably one element of reflexivity – the
foregrounding of the one’s presuppositions and presumed dispositions.20
The text depends on these biases. It cannot do without them just as it
cannot do without its ‘ideological history, the history which generates the
succession of questions and the thread of problematics’21 that seem to
17 Much is to be learnt from Hayden White’s idea of the author’s ‘poetic act’, but this confuses
the act of writing and composing a text, with that of reading it. It is also too formalist and struc-
turalist for the approach taken here. See, White, Metahistory, 30-31: ‘In order to figure “what really
happened” in the past, therefore, the historian must first prefigure as a possible object of knowledge
the whole set of events reported in the documents. This prefigurative act is poetic inasmuch as it is
precognitive and precritical in the economy of the historian’s own consciousness. It is also poetic
insofar as it is constitutive of the structure that will subsequently be imaged in the verbal model
offered by the historian as a representation and explanation of “what really happened” in the past.
But it is constitutive not only of a domain which the historian can treat as a possible object of
(mental) perception. It is also constitutive of the concepts he will use to identify the objects that
inhabit that domain and to characterize the kinds of relationships they can sustain with one another.
In the poetic act which precedes the formal analysis of the field, the historian both creates his object
of analysis and predetermines the modality of the conceptual strategies he will use to explain it.’
(original emphasis)
18 Macherey, A Theory of Literary Production, 41.
19 Jameson, The Political Unconscious, ii.
20 P Schlag, The Enchantment of Reason (Duke University Press 1998), 126-139
21 Macherey, A Theory of Literary Production, 93.
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structure and define it. This history and these problematics, its place in a
given discursive field amongst other texts,22 all infuse themselves into
the legal theoretical text as it produces meaning; as it mediates the rela-
tionship between the explicit and the implicit,23 we must seek to probe
the text for what it does not or cannot say (its unconscious, if you will) by
reaching beyond it.24
These three principles of narrative analysis are better suited to the
act of reading. They function better when applied to the texts of
a given author, rather than the variety of texts that one finds in
the discursive field of a given international legal theory. Their intended
purpose, broadly speaking, is to serve as a tool-kit for those readers
of theoretical texts that wish to think about how ideas are introduced
into the discipline. This is but one route into reflexive inquiry
about the discipline. But I advocate these principles, and apply them
in the remainder of this article, with specific considerations and critical
aspirations in mind – some of my own biases if you will.
At the forefront of these is a renewed appreciation for self-reflexivity
and responsibility in international legal theory. Self-reflexivity is a philo-
sophical posture adopted by the writer, the performer, the practicing
actor – here, the legal theorist. Whilst reflexivity and self-reflexivity
are concepts rooted in divergent and at times conflicting philosophical
positions – from Nietzsche, Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, and Bourdieu,
to name a few – I only articulate it and draw upon it as a general intel-
lectual posture. Philip Allott articulates philosophy as ‘the self-contem-
plating of the human mind, a thinking thing thinking about its thinking,
actor and spectator of its own mental events.’25 To practice the act of
thinking about thinking and applying it to one’s thinking is the act of
self-reflexivity. Being open to, aware of, and open about the ambitions,
limits and prejudices of one’s own ideas produces an ethic of responsi-
bility. It is not enough to realise that one, as a scholar, is not neutral but
rather constantly situated or that reality is not susceptible to neutral,
objective, representation.26 Instead it is about being transparent about
the choices and cultural biases – professional and personal – that animate
22 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 110-11 (he termed this more broadly, as the ‘asso-
ciated field’).
23 Ibid, 87; J Thompson, ‘Language and Ideology: A Framework for Analysis’, (1987) 35 The
Sociological Review 516, 520.
24 Macherey, A Theory of Literary Production, 77-80, 90-95 (though I reject Macherey’s argu-
ment that this is a scientific enterprise, ibid, 52); Jameson, The Political Unconscious, xiii-ix.
25 P Allott, Eunomia: New Order for a New World (OUP 2001), xxix.
26 Normative legal theories with a descriptive dimension normally make a vague disclosure in this
regard, and this has become an indentured caveat in social science methodology, even if it not taken
seriously to heart in either. A claim to a modified objectivity is sustained. See e.g. J Trachtman, The
Economic Structure of International Law (Harvard University Press 2008), 4 (noting ‘illuminations
are not neutral’); M Weber, ‘“Objectivity” in the Social Sciences’ in M Weber, The Methodology of
the Social Sciences (E Shils and H Finch (tr.), Free Press, New York 1949), 49-112.
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the theorist’s conceptual apparatus, ideological stances and choice of
aesthetics. Self-reflexivity is about acknowledging and being open
about the impact of external factors and internal beliefs – to the extent
that this inquiry is possible and useful – because after all, we cannot escape
context.27
The conscious move to consider legal theory, not merely as a theory,
but as narrative is one possible way in which self-reflexivity can be
encouraged. It confronts, at an epistemological level, the essential struc-
ture of normative legal theory: namely, its claim be based on explanatory
descriptive claims, which through a series of justificatory claims, require
certain normative claims. Two challenges are made. First, that such nor-
mative legal theory does not descriptively explain the law, or aspects of
the social world, but rather constructs it. ‘The function of narrative is
not to “represent”, it is to constitute a spectacle.’28 The focus is then
shifted to the more self-conscious question of how this construction takes
place. Second, to conceive of a legal theory as narrative is to acknowledge
how its various component parts (the descriptive, normative, justifica-
tory, as well as the conceptual, illusory and aesthetic) shape each other in
their complex relations within such a text. They are not distinct and
separable intellectual schemes or aspects of a theoretical text/narrative;
rather these parts labour together to create the story that unfolds. The
move to narrative overtly brings into sharp relief a theory’s own process
of production – how the imaginative, aesthetic and conceptual choices
made by the author29 and the cultural conditions in which such
choices were made, create the law we see.30 For a theorist to actively
engage with this question of how, and to practice it, is the self-reflexive
move that is advocated here. While it is reminiscent of those critical
scholars that applied variations of discourse analysis, it is my hope that
the text that follows may also be read to break, in important ways, from
this tradition.
Recent critical scholarship has shown an appreciation of international
legal theory as narrative. Martti Koskenniemi has chosen to accompany
his historiographical turn with a move from theory to narrative.31 The
focus has been to urge the telling of new narratives to enable ‘us to see
27 This sentiment is perhaps found as we note a subtle shift in Allott’s definition of philosophy
from Eunomia, (at xxix) to his P Allott, The Health of Nations: Society and Law Beyond the State
(CUP 2002) 144 (‘Philosophy is the socially organized self-contemplating of the human mind’
(underlined emphasis mine)). See also, S Winter, A Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life and Mind
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2003), xiv-xv, 332-357.
28 R Barthes, ‘Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative’ quoted in H White, ‘The
Question of Narrative in Contemporary Historical Theory’ in White, The Content of Form, 26-57,
37.
29 R West, ‘Jurisprudence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal Theory’, (1985)
60 New York University Law Review 145, 203-211 (focusing on the imaginative choices).
30 White, The Question of Narrative in Contemporary Historical Theory, 35 and 43.
31 Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer, 10. See also, S Singh, ‘The Politics of Martti
Koskenniemi’s Theory’ in W Werner (ed.), Martti Koskenniemi and his Critics (2015, forthcoming)
(exploring the link between this move and the influence of pragmatism).
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things that were previously hidden . . . to diminish the power of blind-
ness’.32 How history is told and whose story is told is essential to his
project, as well as to others such as Anthony Anghie.33 David Kennedy
has sought to advocate for those narratives that highlight the ‘the dy-
namics of power and hierarchy’.34 Other scholarship has chosen to see
recent theories such as international constitutionalism, pluralism etc. as
narratives so as to demonstrate how they let us see the same object of law
in different ways – that each foregrounds different actors, institutions
and visions.35 Each of these critical projects are concerned with reflex-
ivity in relation to the substance of their claims – indeed they draw their
strength from this:36 critical value is attached to narratives depending on
which narrative is told, concern is attached to which worlds we see when
different narratives are applied to it, whilst all the while being aware of
the contingency of the positions taken.
My concern with narrative and narrative analysis differs. I focus on
form, namely the form of legal theory as narrative and the content of this
form. How is the narrative produced? What choices, assumptions, alle-
giances have been made? What cultural biases inform them? How does
the narrative craft the legal world – present and future – into an object of
desire? Each of these questions can be turned on the three critical pro-
jects just outlined, they can be turned on this article – and ought to be.
The reflexive posture ought to be applied to itself.37 These are the re-
flexive considerations that animate my reading of d’Aspremont’s texts.
The remainder of the article will consider some of the aesthetic and
epistemological choices made by d’Aspremont and how these structure
various parts of his text, the intellectual and social conditions in which
these were made, as well as the ideology that emerges from his final
thesis. Part II will consider the role that coherence plays as an aesthetic
choice, as well as a substantive cultural preference for law and the con-
struction of ideas. It questions whether this results in a form of hegem-
ony and a specific form of necessity. Part III looks at the value of an
absent adversary for d’Aspremont’s text and how disciplinary debates
32 M Koskenniemi, ‘Histories of International Law: Dealing with Eurocentrism’, (2011) 19
Rechtsgeschichte 152, 176.
33 A Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (CUP 2005).
34 D Kennedy, ‘The Political Economy of the World’, (2013) 26 LJIL 7, 23.
35 L Lixinski, ‘Narratives of the International Legal Order and Why They Matter: An
Introduction’, (2013) 1 Erasmus Law Review 2-5.
36 P Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason (M Eldred (tr.), University of Minnesota Press,
London, Minneapolis 1987) 5-6.
37 Contemporary critical international legal thinking has avoided the self-reflexive manoeuvre.
That is to say it has avoided questioning the context and nature of its own reflexive inquiry. See
S Singh, ‘Positivism and New Approaches to International Law’ in d’Aspremont and
Kammerhofer, International Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern World, Chapter 12. Indeed, the
critical manoeuvres outlined presume their own notion of epistemological progress, where this
‘consists in the construction and reconstruction of more adequate narratives and forms of narrative
and epistemological crises are occasions for such reconstruction.’ But such projects are problematic,
as shown by A MacIntyre, ‘Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of
Science’ in A MacIntyre, The Tasks of Philosophy: Selected Essays Volume 1 (CUP 2006) 3, 6-8.
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and considerations not addressed in the text contribute to its importance,
value and meaning. Finally, Part IV looks at the form of d’Aspremont’s
Hartian conceptual apparatus – how it is held together, the points at
which it may or may not indicate its own impossibility and its ideological
consequences.
II. A PATHOLOGICAL ‘DESIRE’ FOR COHERENCE
Coherence, today, ‘tends to stand for pretense, untenable claims of
knowledge and authority, and the unacceptable exercise of power.’38
Despite its apparent decline in certain intellectual circles, coherence
maintains a close and persistent relationship with how we think about
and practice law. Here, it is understood as the willingness to flatten
contradictions, or discard conflicts, in order to privilege and bring out
similarities and regularities.39 It is intimately linked to the different no-
tions of consistency, determinacy and order.40 These ideas are appro-
priated, and relied upon, as the need to make law coherent is part and
parcel of the ‘drive to rationalize’.41 They function as part of a common
epistemology that has been a powerful force in modern Western phil-
osophy.42 Coherence is so encultured that it has structured jurispruden-
tial thinking on legal reasoning from Hart to Dworkin,43 possibly been
the foundations for most Anglo-American normative legal thought,44 has
buttressed the liberal ideal of law’s systemic function in political soci-
ety45 and has strongly influenced the practice of international law in a
time of fragmentation.46
The prevalence of and desire for coherence in international legal
thought and practice is unremarkable. However, less so is that it func-
tions as a symbol, or image, certainly an association, for progress, and the
38 Y Ezrahi, The Descent of Icarus: Science and the Transformation of Contemporary Democracy
(Harvard University Press 1990), 283-284 (‘Incoherence, by contrast, seems to indicate humility, a
refusal to suppress subjectivity and diversity, the toleration of numerous notions of purpose, caus-
ation and reality.’)
39 M Prost, The Concept of Unity in Public International Law (Hart, Oxford 2012), 155.
40 Schlag, The Enchantment of Reason, 6-7; P Schlag, ‘The Aesthetics of American Law’, (2002)
115 Harvard Law Review 1049, 1059.
41 Ibid, 1099.
42 K Kress, ‘Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin’s Right Thesis, Retroactivity,
and the Linear Order of Decisions’, (1984) 72 California Law Review 369, 370.
43 Ibid; Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, 33-37.
44 P Schlag, ‘Normativity and the Politics of Form’, (1991) 139 University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 801; P Kahn, The Cultural Study of Law: Reconstructed Legal Scholarship (University of
Chicago Press, Chicago 1999) 7-30 (critiquing the pathology of normative legal thinking in this
regard).
45 Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, 23-38.
46 ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and
Expansion of International Law’, Report of the Study Group of the International Law
Commission, Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006, paras. 22, 33-35,
487. For a critique of the Report’s approach to coherence, see S Singh, ‘The Potential of
International Law: Fragmentation and Ethics’, (2011) 24 LJIL 23, 33-35.
313FORMALISM’S RECURRENT RETURN
 by guest on D
ecem
ber 6, 2014
http://bybil.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
hegemonic manoeuvres this can induce. This is to say that coherence is
desired – and this desire is pathological – but this desire is in fact a desire
for progress. It is this that is infused, in various guises, throughout
d’Aspremont’s text. Coherence functions on a number of levels – epis-
temological, aesthetic and ethical. When suited and wished, it is a prop-
erty presumed of the world, and at other points it is a property to be
imposed upon and realised within the world. It is each of these images
that emplots d’Aspremont’s text in various ways and draws a certain kind
of relationship between the concepts, images and aesthetics that he in-
vokes. That reality is reduced is the very logic of formalism, for this is
where the stringency of ever more formal rules requires a reductive ap-
proach to reality. At the same time, d’Aspremont seeks to build a theory
that is sustained by appreciating ‘practice’. The need to simultaneously
reduce reality and appreciate its complexity is the tension that is mir-
rored throughout his text. Importantly, it is a tension denied; one that is
all the more apparent when it is most stringently repressed.
A. Coherence, Order and Necessity
d’Aspremont argues that his renewal and resurrection of source formal-
ism is urgently necessary. FSIL may reintroduce order at a time of dis-
order; it can answer questions that are existential to the discipline. The
narrative, here, is emplotted by an almost pure romanticism: the dis-
ordered world we experience today may be overcome.47 This is argued in
two moves.
First, d’Aspremont presents the reader with a world filled with dis-
order, both in international legal scholarship and in practice. Scholarly
debates are ‘cacophonic’, not far ‘from becoming a henhouse or a Tower
of Babel’ (34), occurring amongst ‘a cluster of different scholarly com-
munities’ (3) that seemingly ‘talk past each other’ because each of them
uses ‘different criteria for the ascertainment of legal rules’ (34).
Coherence and order is still valued to remedy this in times of intellectual
specialisation and fragmentation.48 And yet, the inability to distinguish
law from non-law, to determine what is law, is perhaps the greatest
form of disorder. The rigorous ability to distinguish law from non-law
in a complex world is becoming impossible (1). The concern is not only
the proliferation of rules, but that their modes of production have
‘undergone an intricate and multi-fold pluralization’ (2). The formal
sources currently employed have ‘grown inappropriate to capture
contemporary international norms’ (3). What we see from
47 White, Metahistory, 8-9; N Frye, The Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton
University Press 1957), 158-238; West, Jurisprudence as Narrative, 150-151.
48 P Allott, ‘Law and Social Evolution: Post-Evolutionary Human Involution’, ASIL-ESIL
Workshop University of Cambridge Speech, 20-21 September 2012; S Singh, ‘Two Potential
Paths Forward from Fragmentation Discourse: Sociology and Ethics’, (2011) 105 ASIL Proc 130.
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d’Aspremont is not merely discursive complexity but also that of inter-
national legal practice.
Second, d’Aspremont then situates this problem of disorder, and
its corresponding ideal of order, as an existential issue within interna-
tional law. Disorder, in both its guises, is not a trifling issue, but one that
cuts to the core of our discipline.49 The following concerns are pressed,
as ones of imminent necessity, onto the reader: if one cannot separate law
from non-law how can the normative character – namely, law’s ability to
generate and effect change in the behaviour of its addressees – of inter-
national law survive? (30) If legal rules have no normativity how can
international law retain its authority? (31-33) If international law lacks
authority and normativity, separately and interdependently, is the dis-
cipline itself being sidelined? If identification of rules lies along some
arbitrary normative ‘continuum’ (1) how can international law retain its
disciplinary and discursive individuality from the grasp of international
politics? If the conceptualization of norms is based on examining their
effects – namely, ‘whether and how subjects . . . come to accept those
norms, rules and standards’50 – then are we not introducing a new nat-
ural law within the discipline? Is this not merely the guise under which
political science becomes the grounding for research into international
law?
FSIL’s own necessity is found in how it foregrounds each of these
questions. d’Aspremont confronts the reader with them and by the
book’s end ensures that this confrontation is indispensible. His answer
is unambiguous and presented with great clarity: source formalism is
the saviour of international law’s normativity, authority and relevance.
It can help sustain a disciplinary core. Deformalization is the enemy
found in both practice and theory (119-30). This drama is one that is
cast through the counterpoints of disorder/order, threat/defence and
disease/medicine – and these weave themselves throughout the text.
But in each of these counterpoints, the move is from left to right; the
story is about transcending disorder and achieving order. It is a story of
triumph, made all the more important because, it is just that much more
necessary at this historical juncture.
B. Coherence, the Politics of Theory and Hegemony
A large part of FSIL is dedicated to ordering various theories of inter-
national law and their relevance to theorising the sources of international
49 d’Aspremont does at one stage seem to recognise that one of the key topics considered within
his book, that of determinacy, indeterminacy and disambiguation, is an ‘existential question’ that
‘will abidingly continue to fuel scholarly debates’ (143). In my view this topic is only one of the
existential issues addressed by d’Aspremont.
50 J. Klabbers, ‘Law-making and Constitutionalism’ in J. Klabbers, A. Peters, G. Ulfstein (eds.),
The Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2009), 98. Quoted in d’Aspremont,
(122).
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law. It is a process that allows d’Aspremont to compartmentalise various
theories, to adequately demarcate them, in order to sustain and guard the
conceptual space for his Hartian source thesis. This is, in part, a con-
scious process, and simultaneously a process that d’Aspremont’s text
undergoes and unconsciously enacts. Coherence is the ‘preliminary cri-
terion’51 of this ordering. Here, coherence is to be understood as an
aesthetic, and not only a substantive ethical predisposition of ‘the
good’. In this sense it ‘pertains to the forms, images, tropes, perceptions,
and sensibilities that help shape the creation, apprehension, and even
identity of human endeavours, including, most topically, law.’52
d’Aspremont’s ‘rejuvenation’ (5) of source formalism is achieved as
much by how this aesthetic functions throughout his text, as by virtue
of the substance of his thesis.53 What I explore is how it reflects the
marketing of an idea in parts of our discipline.
The first three substantive chapters of the book (Chapters 2-4) are
concerned with precisely this demarcation strategy. FSIL begins by
delineating the specific type of formalism the book is concerned with.
This is not the formalism of legal argumentation, process-based law
creation or State consent, but one of the ascertainment of legal rules
according to formal yardsticks (12-25). These distinctions are welcome,
but as will be seen it may be difficult for d’Aspremont to sustain his
distinction between the formalism of sources, and that of what he terms
substantive legal argumentation (see Part V.B. below). d’Aspremont
then explores the extent to which a formalism regarding sources is
explored in general legal theory and international legal theory. We are
whisked from Austin and Bentham, to Kelsen and Hart, before resting
on Twining and Tamanaha, within general jurisprudence (38-62). Even
at this juncture, the book’s focus is squarely on how social observational
understandings of the source thesis have been refined and historically
understood. Unfortunately, it all but ignores the ruptures and disagree-
ments between these theorists. For instance, the sharp divide between
Hart and Kelsen is all but sidelined as a coherent picture of the book’s
central thesis is painted.54
Demarcating the relevance or irrelevance of certain theories to one’s
own thesis can be achieved in a number of ways. d’Aspremont does not
simply discard competing theories as irrelevant, i.e. the simple
51 M Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (Routledge, London
2005), xxi (‘there is no similitude and no distinction, even for the wholly untrained perception, that
is not the result of a precise operation and of the application of a preliminary criterion.’)
52 Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 1050.
53 Not only does the aesthetic foreground the substantive thesis, but the assertion of this aesthetic
is a moment of power. The nature of this power is hard to identify because ‘an aesthetic impos-
ition . . . escapes determination by reason. It is the artistic, rhetorical, political moment par excel-
lence. It is important to avoid romanticizing this moment. It may be a creative moment, but it is one
with very high stakes, and it is not necessarily benign.’ Ibid, 1111, fn. 227.
54 See generally, J Beckett, ‘The Hartian Tradition in International Law’, (2008) 1 The Journal
of Jurisprudence 51.
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mechanics of exclusion, but rather seeks to reconcile his own thesis with
the tenets of competing theories. This process requires downplaying and
subsuming the potential critiques of these other theories (217-220),
rather than seeing conflict and competition between them. Where cri-
tiques of Hart are acknowledged, their significance is immediately
bracketed. For example, the reader is introduced to Dworkin, but his
critique of Hart’s social thesis is not fully considered, let alone answered
(88-90). Another example: ‘New Legal Realism cannot be construed as a
proper critique of formalism’ (105), even if its emphasis on socio-struc-
tural considerations within law would have a great deal to say about the
limits of d’Aspremont’s social thesis based formalism. The critique from
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) is considered as being directed towards the
‘discipline’ (114), the ‘legal consciousness of the profession’ (93) and the
formalism of legal argumentation (112-3). The acknowledgment that
CLS has also ‘delivered a fundamental critique of law-ascertainment
models’, (115) and offered ‘the most powerful [contemporary] critique’
(11) and not ‘spared the social thesis’ (116) are all emphatic statements
deserving of greater attention. I do not contend that each of these need to
be explored – this would be unenviable task. My concern is that conflict,
discord and struggle are subsumed under the label of mere difference.
This not only protects d’Aspremont’s thesis from critique but also im-
ports a sense that these theories can be easily and coherently compart-
mentalised. The aesthetic virtue of order, amongst (non-conflictual)
plurality, is again prioritised. There is, however, an interminable tension
that marks this process.
On the one hand, d’Aspremont can (and does in later work55) defend
his disinterest in the details of various critiques by relying on the equiva-
lent to Thomas Kuhn’s methodological incommensurability thesis. This
thesis argues that scientific theories ‘see different things when they look
from the same point in the same direction’,56 that they exist in ‘different
worlds’.57 Certain theoretical approaches may be considered a priori in-
compatible with other theories. For Kuhn, ‘evaluation across different
conceptual schemata, ways of life, or cultures is impossible.’58 To choose
one theory is to necessarily forego the other – positivism/naturalism,
idealism/realism etc.
However, had he so chosen d’Aspremont could have let us see these
theories as commensurable. Perhaps because certain legal theories
emerge from a common epistemology, or by appealing to common in-
tellectual structures such as ‘science’, ‘reason’, ‘realism’, or even because
55 d’Aspremont, Reductionist Legal Positivism, 370; d’Aspremont, Wording, 596-599 (speaking
of paradigms and paradigmic revolution).
56 T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago University Press 1970), 150.
57 Ibid.
58 R Chang, ‘Introduction’ in R Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical
Reason (Harvard University Press 1997) 1-33, 1.
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they belong to the same tradition.59 However, the intellectual progeny of
Kuhn is preferred. This provides a strong immunity from critique, and
imports a sense of the reasonable theorist – we can agree to disagree
because we are talking about very different things and with very different
world-viewpoints, even if we appear to be starting from the same point.
It allows a theorist to cast aside as paradigmically different those theories
that may pose the greatest critique. It is however based on a theory of
knowledge of the hard sciences, and not of the social sciences. In FSIL,
its application allows d’Aspremont to defend his resurrection of Hart
against its strongest critics: Dworkin, New Legal Realism and CLS
work with different conceptual schemata and visions of the world to
Hart’s social thesis. The methodological immunity from critique ought
to be self-evident.
On the other hand however, d’Aspremont presents his thesis as having
‘conciliatory virtues’ (217): ‘it helps reconcile some allegedly antonymic
trends in international legal scholarship’ (218). To reconcile competing
claims between theories presumes the possibility of a discursive relation-
ship between theories. It presumes that two theories can communicate as
well as a degree of understanding between them that is not inherently
asymmetrical. It presumes commensurability between such theories.
Here, in d’Aspremont’s discourse of conciliation, methodological incom-
mensurability can be avoided, theories can be reconciled, and the rea-
sonable theorist, aware of competing arguments is capable of weaving
between them.
There appears to be a conflict in how d’Aspremont’s theory is pos-
itioned in relation to other theories. To only expose this methodological
issue would be to miss how it functions as a narrative tactic to elevate
d’Aspremont’s thesis. I offer two interpretations of how this move is
made.
It should be clear that Kuhnian incommensurability between theories
depends upon there being a position where one can identify competing
theories as incommensurable. It presumes a position where each theory
can be understood – an independent point from which to compare these
theories and identify their incommensurability. The first potential cri-
tique of d’Aspremont is not that he attempts to adopt conflicting starting
points in how to view the relationship between legal theories (incom-
mensurability and conciliation) but that he does not explore the conse-
quences of adopting both together. This results in the sense that FSIL
privileges order and discursive coherence, indeed this is imposed, over
any substantial engagement with the greatest critics of his thesis, those
with whom it finds contradiction and conflict. One is left with the
feeling that a Kuhnian methodology is superficially and strategically
59 See generally, S Pepper, World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence (University of California
Press, Berkeley 1966), 141 et seq.; White, Metahistory, 23; A MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study
of Moral Theory (University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 3rd edn. 2007), 204-225.
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deployed to bracket the fierce competition that one finds between ideas,
and introduces the ideal of harmony amongst diversity.60 The strategies
of marketing an idea, it seems, are still so characteristically liberal.61
There remains another possible interpretation of d’Aspremont’s meth-
odological manoeuvrings. It is premised on appropriating the effects of
intellectual and theoretical specialisation, alongside the functioning of
hegemony within international legal scholarship. d’Aspremont’s formal-
ism is only concerned with the identification of rules; it is ‘modest’.62
This narrow and particular claim allows d’Aspremont to assert that
other legal theories may and can ‘explain the whole phenomenon of
law’.63 FSIL’s formalism, because of its modesty, and claim to be
solely concerned with the identification of norms, can ‘underpin the
continuously mutually enriching character of . . .multiple strands of
contemporary international legal scholarship’ (218), because it is ‘non-
exclusive, non-confrontational and conciliatory’ (219). The author
presumes that his approach to theory can promote ‘ecumenism’64 or
unity within international legal scholarship. Whilst d’Aspremont
seems, again, to elevate a peaceful coherent vision of international legal
scholarship, there may be other motives.
Underpinning d’Aspremont’s argument is first the assertion that unity
across international legal scholarship can be achieved if its arena can be
carved up into different component parts (different areas of enquiry) that
may be governed by different theories. d’Aspremont neo-formalism can
govern the identification of rules, by outlining a theory on the sources of
international law; constructivists and international legal realists can exam-
ine international law as a social and material construct, and may critique
the application of legal rules; and so on. This allows d’Aspremont to cast
aside competing theories.65 It is an approach that reduces legal theories to
works of theoretical specialisation that only relate to very narrow and
different jurisprudential enquiries. Coherence is imposed on the field
with the aid of such presumed and stringent specialisation. Legal theories
are compartmentalised and potential conflicts are eschewed. However,
this is a position that of course cannot embrace conciliatory unity through
discussion between theories, or even a measure of Kuhnian incommen-
surability (because you are not looking from the same point to start with,
but rather start off with very different enquiries).
It is doubtful that these theories can be carved up in this manner, or
that the conceptual apparatuses used to examine the application and
60 Later writings do little to assuage this concern. See d’Aspremont, Reductionist Legal
Positivism’, 369.
61 The idea of finding order amongst pluralism and fragmentation is a dominant concern in late
modernity and postmodernity, as well as political liberalism and neo-liberalism. See e.g. D Harvey,
The Condition of Postmodernity (Blackwell, Oxford 1990), 5-9.
62 d’Aspremont, Reductionist Legal Positivism, 370.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 See further Singh, Positivism and New Approaches to International Law.
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identification of legal rules, can be so easily separated. More importantly,
reality itself cannot be carved up in this manner. Theory itself cannot be
so non-confrontational when it is concerned with a Hartian thesis that
has been persistently challenged for the last fifty years. It especially
cannot be so when laying claim to international law’s form. If the sources
of international law are the gateway to legality, normative claims as to
how formal they ought to be cannot be innocent and non-confronta-
tional. When one considers each of these concerns together, it is difficult
to not conceive of d’Aspremont’s neo-formalism as seeking a theoretical
monopoly on international law’s key: its sources. The ‘responsibility
assigned to [my project] remains, in my view, of primary importance.’66
d’Aspremont’s ordering of the discursive field is the imposition of a ‘false
unity’67 behind which, in all likelihood, lies a hegemonic manoeuvre
garbed in conciliatory clothing.
C. Coherence, Eternal Return and False Progress
By now it should be relatively clear that it is not so much the pathological
desire for coherence that structures d’Aspremont’s text. Coherence is a
symptom or image for progress seen as order. We have seen how this
plays out as a romantic drama in d’Aspremont’s treatment of interna-
tional legal scholarship. It is also found in the substance of
d’Aspremont’s thesis which will be detailed and critiqued in section
IV. Unsurprisingly it lies at the heart of d’Aspremont’s Hartian social
thesis: sufficient uniform and communitarian coherence exists in the
practice of law applying authorities to determine increasingly formal
standards for the rules relating to the sources of international law. In
contrast to d’Aspremont’s romantic emplotment (which relies on dis-
order as a starting point), reality is now, in his substantive argument,
seen as sufficiently coherent, without conflict or contradictions, to give
rise to more formal sources rules – it is presupposed rather than imposed.
There is now no need for triumph. But for d’Aspremont there is a need
to make law more determinate, indeed this must be imposed, if interna-
tional law is to confront its challenges. Less indeterminate sources lead to
a more determinate and coherent international legal order. The focus of
d’Aspremont’s romantic drive has shifted: it is now for a coherent legal
system, understood as a set of rules, not for a coherent social world. But
greater determinacy, greater clarity, and greater coherence are the pre-
requisites of progress for the discipline at this historical juncture.
Of course, this argument is not new. Rather, it bears all the hallmarks
of inter-war discourse in international law.68 The formalist’s, and
66 Ibid (emphasis added).
67 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 38.
68 Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer, 266-352; S Astorino, ‘The Impact of Sociological
Jurisprudence on International Law in the Interwar Period’, (1996) 34 Duquesne Law Review
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d’Aspremont’s desire for greater determinacy is dogmatic in the sense
that it is willing to impose this upon, whilst claiming to “find” it within,
reality. It is willing to cast aside the contradictions and conflicts found in
reality. This is the pathology of a formalist’s coherence. During the
inter-war period this mentality was required for renewal and rehabilita-
tion within the discipline. Today it is required to confront the complex-
ities of the world and the vagaries of theorizing (1-3). Coherence
promises progress and transcendence. It is set to work in
d’Aspremont’s text as an almost entirely romantic emplotment. This,
as Nietzsche well knew, was a false promise; it is the burden of eternal
return.69 From Jhering and Heck, to the Scandinavian legal realists, and
some American legal realists, we see the same willingness to squeeze the
social into the formal in order to argue that the sources of law have been
discerned. The worry is that the ‘disciplinary hamster wheel’70 continues
to spin unbounded. Not only is this functioning of structure hidden from
d’Aspremont’s narrative (i.e. the reflexive move is not considered), but it
is accompanied by promises that are unlikely to be fulfilled.
This critique, to the extent that it is the natural counterpoint to
d’Aspremont’s logic of coherence, is also just another rotation on the
same wheel. Coherence, for d’Aspremont’s text, is both an aesthetic
and a substantive ethical predisposition; it functions as a symbol and
image for a progress that will not come. It provide the initial pleasure,
and ultimate discontent, of myths:
Myth does not deny things, on the contrary, its function is to talk about them;
simply its purifies them, it makes them innocent, it gives them a natural and
eternal justification . . .myth acts economically: it abolishes the complexity from
human acts, its gives them the simplicity of their essences, it does away with all
dialectics, with any going back beyond what is immediately visible, it organizes
the world which is without contradictions because it is without depth, a world
wide open and wallowing in the evident, it establishes a blissful clarity . . .71
III. SAVING THE DISCIPLINE: CONQUERING AN ABSENT ADVERSARY
FSIL’s adversary is deformalization, in its various guises (119-136).
d’Aspremont’s romantic emplotment requires that this adversary be con-
fronted and overcome. But d’Aspremont accompanies this with an effort
to divulge the politics and biases of his formalism (137-147) and
277; T Skouteris, The Notion of Progress in International Law Discourse (TMC Asser Press, The
Hague 2010), Chapter 3.
69 F Nietzsche, The Gay Science (B Williams (ed.), J Nauckhoff (tr.), CUP 2008), 194-195,
section 341 (outlining the condition of thinking for an ever-returning way of thinking).
70 D Kennedy, ‘When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box’, (2000) 32 New York
University Journal of International Law and Politics 335, 407.
71 R Barthes, Mythologies (A Levers (tr.), The Noonday Press, New York 1972), 143.
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deformalization (130-136). The effort to expose the politics of a dis-
course is to an extent the limited result of postmodern intellectual move-
ments, but it is also a method appropriated by traditional normative legal
theories. What I mean by this is that to expose the politics of one’s
position, and of one’s adversary, is to be able to demonstrate that legal
theory can be transparent about motives, can exist in a certain pluralism
and that a reader or theorist can make a neutral choice about which
position she may prefer.72 In this liberal co-option of the postmodern
posture, the reader is left with the image that she is fully informed of the
substantive positions of different theories and what lies behind these
positions (their politics and motives), and so can make an autonomous
choice between positions. The preservation of rational and autonomous
choice is key for the liberal legal theorist.73
d’Aspremont presents the reader with a choice between the politics of
deformalization and the politics of formalism. That is, a preference for
the self-serving quest to expand international law’s normative reach and
stretching the discipline’s frontiers (130-134), or for the preservation of
international law’s normative character and therefore its authority, legit-
imacy and efficacy (145). The second choice presented is between ac-
cepting indeterminacy or striving ‘to disambiguate legal rules’ (142).
Several important questions emerge: are these really free, autonomous
choices that a legal theorist can make? What are the true politics of
deformalization: how has d’Aspremont’s constructed his adversary and
is this sufficient? Will making the ‘right’ choices (formalism and relative
determinacy) really save the discipline?
I argue that d’Aspremont’s FSIL does not fully explore the depths of
the politics at play behind the resurgence of formalism; that these con-
cerns lie dormant in his text and more emphatically emerge from the
discipline’s ‘associated field’. The move to formalism is about disciplin-
ary colonization and empire. Saving the discipline, as d’Aspremont’s
comic romance seeks to do,74 is about realising that there is no escape
from this disciplinary drama.
d’Aspremont understands that international law is constituted by ‘bat-
tle[s] within the profession’ and ‘battle[s] among professions’. In this
sense he understands the relevance of Foucault (133). He understands
that disciplines are social constructs, subject to the direction and whimsy
of its participants – though of course not any whimsical direction is open
to them. A discipline’s continuity and evolution depends, like all trad-
itions, on the sustainability of a core set of beliefs, rules or ‘entrenched
ideas’.75 But it is also constituted by continuous conflict over
72 d’Aspremont talks about choices in FSIL, Chapter 6 and Reductionist Legal Positivism.
73 P Schlag, ‘The Empty Circles of Liberal Justification’, (1997) 96 Michigan Law Review 1, 19.
74 White, Metahistory, 9 (providing a definition of comedy in narrative).
75 Crawford, International Law as a Discipline and Profession, 476 (‘the system is ordered such
that entrenched ideas are unlikely to succumb, as distinct from being modified through practice or
the accretion of new ideas and values’).
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interpretations of its identity, its limit and its potential. Epistemic dis-
agreements are key to the discipline’s sustenance, renewal and fortitude.
But it is only where such disagreements destabilise the core beliefs or
rules of a discipline that it risks descending into incoherence and rup-
ture. In approaching the issue of deformalization and the need to save the
discipline, two questions need to be asked: (a) is international law such a
discipline that operates around a core set of beliefs, rules or ‘entrenched
ideas’? If so, (b) does deformalization as presented by d’Aspremont
threaten to disrupt such core beliefs or rules?
Before these questions are addressed, what does d’Aspremont mean by
his concept of deformalization? He asserts that to devise a sources theory
based on moral or ethical criteria (119), or on the effectiveness of norms
(122), or on an understanding of law as process (127), is to embrace
deformalization. He focuses on the second and third of these (4, 29,
105-110, 122-128). These various understandings have ‘led to the exist-
ence of a grey area where it is not possible to distinguish law from non-
law’ (128). He rightly draws attention to disciplinary motives for such
deformalization: the construction of new rules, promoting the expansion
of international law, a self-serving quest for new legal materials, and
fulfilling an authority deficit (130-134). I argue, however, that
d’Aspremont does not push his analysis far enough. His conceptual ana-
lysis of deformalization is thorough, but he does not fully explore the
consequences, ideational and material, of such a concern within interna-
tional law. Formalism has been resurgent as a European posture in re-
sponse to empire, instrumentalism, disciplinary colonization and the
threat of ‘extinction’76 of the discipline. d’Aspremont has subsequently
sought to relate the politics of his formalism to this wider disciplinary
political drama.77 The significance of FSIL cannot be divorced from the
wider European posture found in international law’s discursive field;
these are the determinate conditions in which the book was produced
and is read.
FSIL rightly takes issue with compliance being used as a yardstick for
the ascertainment of international legal rules (122). d’Aspremont rallies
against the following effects-based understanding of law-ascertainment
(122, footnote 28):
Once it is recognized that law’s existence is best measured by the influence it
exerts, and not by formal tests of validity rooted in normative hierarchies, inter-
national lawyers can finally eschew the preoccupation with legal pedigree
(sources) that has constrained creative thinking within the discipline for
generations.78
76 Ibid, 485.
77 J d’Aspremont and J Kammerhofer, ‘Introduction’ in Kammerhofer and d’Aspremont,
International Legal Positivism in a Postmodern World.
78 J Brunne´e and S Toope, ‘International Law and Constructivism, Elements of an International
Theory of International Law’, (2000) 39 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 19, 65.
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Whilst this is the statement of self-confessed constructivist scholars
within the field of international relations, a number of legal scholars
(notably American) have sought to identify what is law by its effective-
ness and compliance.79 The formal logic of law is reduced to economic
functionality: in ‘economic terms, law is relevant to the extent that it
generates a marginal increase in compliance.’80 The use of rational choice
theory by American international legal scholars collapses a distinction
that has long been cherished by European jurisprudence: what the law is,
is a different inquiry to whether it is effective or not. Rational choice
theory assumes self-interest as a determining directive, rather than an
analytical tool. ‘International law emerges from states’ pursuit of
self-interested policies on the international stage . . . It is not a check on
self-interest, it’s a product of self-interest.’81 Rational choice law and
economics theorists do not simply provide another angle of observation.
In recent European scholarship it has been received as a project of dis-
ciplinary colonization and one that buttresses American empire, in which
deformalization is but one move.82 The moves may be considered as
follows.
First, the interdisciplinarity introduced by rational choice law and
economics is one that formalises international law. It simplifies the com-
plexity of international legal rules and their functioning.83 It formalises
to the extent that it requires international law to be simpler and more
determinate than it actually is. This is a methodological necessity to the
extent that such law and economics theorist need a static, simplified and
formal object whose effectiveness can be measured. Its methodology
requires concrete, measurable and verifiable considerations; it is pre-
mised on a series of empirical claims that are often vaunted as ‘objective’.
It seeks to harness an ideational power possibly more forceful than that
of law, that of ‘science’.84
Second, just as law and economics scholarship can formalise to the
point of absurd simplification, it just as willingly deformalizes. This
deformalization manifests itself in distinct senses of the concept. At
the most abstract level, rational choice law and economics theorists
79 See most recently, E Posner and A Sykes, Economic Foundations of International Law (Harvard
University Press 2013).
80 A Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (OUP, New York 2008),
22-23.
81 J Goldsmith and E Posner, The Limits of International Law (OUP, New York 2005), 13; see
also, E Posner, ‘Do States have a Moral Obligation to Comply with International Law?’, (2003) 55
Stanford Law Review 1901; E Posner, The Perils of Global Legalism (University of Chicago Press,
Chicago 2009), ix, xv.
82 Klabbers, The Relative Autonomy of International Law or the Forgotten Politics of
Interdisciplinarity, 36; Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer, 489; M Koskenniemi, ‘Law,
Teleology and International Relations: An Essay in Counterdisciplinarity’, (2012) 26
International Relations 3, 18.
83 Klabbers, The Relative Autonomy of International Law or the Forgotten Politics of
Interdisciplinarity, 36-38; Crawford, International Law as a Discipline and Profession, 482-484.
84 M Foucault, ‘Two Lectures’ in M Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other
Writings 1972-77 (C Gordon (ed.), Pantheon, New York 1980) 78, 85
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remove or marginalize the need to ask the legal question. These scholars
prioritise the approach to international law with a deontological question
of its effectiveness and compliance. This is necessarily a question that
cannot be answered by recourse to a legal rationality or method – the
relevant method is the empiricism of economics or political science.
Third, on a less abstract level, such scholars consider irrelevant the
distinction between different international legal sources. If form is to be
found in the sources of international law, as d’Aspremont contends, then
this is a certainly a form of deformalization. It is irrelevant to consider
whether one is concerned with soft law or accepted legal rules, standard
or stringently formal rules; what matters is which norms, irrespective
of source pedigree, influence state behaviour.85 The concern of whether
a norm is a rule of the international legal system is considered irrele-
vant; what makes a rule specifically legal is discarded as an irrelevant
inquiry.
Fourth, as can be seen in Brunne´e and Toope’s remark, the effective-
ness of a international norm conditions whether it may be considered a
legal rule. What is considered legal requires first answering a non-legal
question. Law is no longer a closed-off, self-validating system, but rather
one that bows to the logic of political scientific determinations. Academic
conquest cannot be more subversive than this. What is governed, by a
non-formal and hence non-legal rationality, is arguably the master sig-
nifier for international law: its sources. The actor whose conceptual ap-
paratus is able to determine a discourse’s master signifier is able to
control its direction and content. In turn, this suggests that international
law’s autonomy is impossible.
If left here, the debate remains purely ideational; what we have is
the conceptual framework of rational choice law and economics
theorists and the process by which this framework deformalizes. But
this would be to miss the debate’s essential connection to power, more
specifically, the material dimensions of power. This concern emerges in
two senses.
The first is the role that rational choice law and economics theorists
play in subjugating the field of international law and their role in redis-
tributing the allocation of disciplinary power.86 In 2005, Goldsmith and
Posner remarked that there ‘is a more sophisticated international law
literature in the international relations subfield of political science.’87
For some European scholars, it is concerned with becoming the new
international law.88 But this charge towards disciplinary dominance is
driven and sustained by law and economics’ robust and expanding
material base. Here rational choice law and economics is no longer
seen as just a theory – a conceptual apparatus with conceptual
85 Guzman, How International Law Works, 9, 142-147.
86 Klabbers, The Bridge Crack’d, 120.
87 Goldsmith and Posner, The Limits of International Law, 15.
88 Koskenniemi, Counterdisciplinarity, 18.
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consequences – but a project. Its institutional moorings, and theorists,
have expanded well beyond its birthplace at the University of Chicago.
Funding bodies such as the Ohlin Foundation has ensured that institutes
for law and economics exist through the US. Those that subscribe to it,
have introduced the theory into judicial decision-making – most notably
Richard Posner. The material reach of the law and economics project
extends well beyond the shores of the US, but it is there that it has
become engrained. To recognise that the school has particular socio-
political ambitions is to realise that its continued expansion may shift
and govern various parts of the international legal discipline.
The second relationship to power is how such projects support and
enable empire.89 Koskenniemi has lamented the manner in which both
liberal and neo-liberal American international legal scholarship has pro-
vided the basis for empire.90 Crawford is concerned ‘that much that
passes for the study of international law in the United States academy
is at best the foreign relations law of the United States with ideological
interpolations.’91 Deformalization and the conceptual consequences of
the law and economics movement are not only ideas that can compete
with each, but rather ones that may influence and support the practice of
international law and international relations in the United States. Such
ideas ‘cannot but buttress the justifications for American empire’.92
The reasons why d’Aspremont’s approach to deformalization is prob-
lematic ought now to be clearer. His overarching narrative is premised
on not only overcoming deformalization, in its various guises, as an ad-
versary, but also on allowing the reader to make a free autonomous
choice between competing projects (deformalization/formalism and in-
determinacy/relative determinacy) by exposing their politics.
d’Aspremont, however, does not fully explore the nature of his adversary
or the full conceptual consequences of deformalization. I have attempted
to look at some of these discursive disciplinary consequences. But defor-
malization ought also to be understood as a concept with specific rela-
tionships to power. The choice required of the reader cannot be made
without these additional considerations. The choice that one is making is
not merely between different theoretical or conceptual strategies, but
between competing material projects with particular socio-political am-
bitions. Given deformalization’s relationships to power, the value given
to such a choice may be greatly overestimated; what can be legitimately
achieved by ‘choosing’ formalism may be very little indeed.
d’Aspremont’s narrative, to the extent it views deformalization as an
adversary, is now not so much structured by the tropes of a romantic
comedy, as it is by tragedy.93
89 See generally, J Ohlin, The Assault on International Law (OUP, 2014 forthcoming).
90 See Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer; Koskenniemi, Counterdisciplinarity.
91 Crawford, International Law as a Discipline and a Profession, 484.
92 Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer, 484.
93 White, Metahistory, 9 (defining tragedy as a narrative concept)..
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To think that the discipline can be saved in the manner that
d’Aspremont advocates may be misguided, but perhaps more so is the
belief that it needs to be.94 Of course deformalization places into ques-
tion certain core beliefs or rules of the discipline: it removes international
law’s capability to autonomously determine what is legal or illegal so it is
no longer a self-validating or closed-system procedure, and it does away
with the sources doctrines. Even though d’Aspremont does not fully ex-
plore these consequences or the reasons for them, they represent a deep
disagreement about the discipline’s identity. And yet they are unlikely to
destabilise it in any considerable way. This is not because international
law may always rely on other entrenched ideas, but because deformaliza-
tion is a known argumentative trope within the discipline. Alongside for-
malism, deformalization has long appeared as part of the drama of
governance within the discipline. Modern manifestations are no more
than a variation on a theme. At a conceptual level the discipline cannot
be threatened with incoherence and rupture by ideas and argumentative
strategies that it has long internalized. If there has to be any ‘core’ for the
discipline it is not the myth of unshakable foundations or core concepts.
Rather, a discipline functions and evolves through its reliance on tensions
and conflicts. An appreciation of the inherent tension found in both the
determinacy-indeterminacy and formalism-deformalization axes allows
us to acknowledge that conflicting, and at times contradictory, positions
comprise ‘an intrinsic element [of] the discipline’s identity and unity.’95
The discipline’s resilience lies in how it internalises conflicting claims
over its identity.
The choices given to the reader, between relative determinacy and
formalism or indeterminacy and deformalization, would seem to be mis-
leading. Neither, alone, is adequate for d’Aspremont’s romantic emplot-
ment. The reader is given a choice already conditioned and within the
structure of the international legal discipline, the conflictual and contra-
dictory structure that it is.96 To elide such structure and its constraint on
choice is the very function of any ideological text. If the reader is to make
a choice, it ought to be done in the full knowledge that she is still within
the known tropes of the discipline. In short, choices are not always as
autonomous as often presumed.
IV. THE THESIS: ORDER, DETERMINACY AND THE IDEOLOGIES OF
METHOD
I have argued that FSIL’s narrative is structured around two pivots:
coherence and an adversary. These induce a specific set of relationships
94 This critique can be found in other accounts, see e.g. Crawford, International Law as a
Discipline and a Profession.
95 Prost, The Concept of Unity in Public International Law, 155.
96 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 38-39.
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between various elements of d’Aspremont’s text. Indeed, they attach
themselves to specific concepts. Recall the relationship between coher-
ence and order, necessity, discursive unity and progress, or deformaliza-
tion’s relationship to choice and disciplinarity. These pivots also work
through the text on an emotional level: coherence and order seduces the
reader into thinking that there may be a correct or right legal decision
and that legal theories can exist in harmony, whilst deformalization relies
on fear and the ultimate provision of hope. But these pivots, concepts,
aesthetics and emotions can also highlight that there is something else
going on within the text and outside of it. It is with these considerations
in mind that we arrive at the content of d’Aspremont’s Hartian thesis.
This section will first outline the thesis and look at how it has de-
veloped in relation to d’Aspremont’s work on post-modern positivism
(A). It then conceptually deconstructs d’Aspremont’s Hartian approach
to determinacy (B) and the ideological tenets of his social thesis (C). I
look at how formalism’s dependence on determinacy constructs a series
of relationship with other concepts such as indeterminacy and normative
authority, whilst also importing a specific theory of language. What
emerges is a legal theory that is constantly self-referential, persistently
trying (and often failing) to exclude precisely the sort of inquiries that
may disrupt its logic.
A. d’Aspremont’s Formalism: a Description
In FSIL d’Aspremont states that his book ‘falls short of supporting legal
positivism as a whole’ (26) and that his call for greater source formalism
cannot be conflated with a plea for legal positivism (8). However, since
the publication of this monograph, he has advocated for and developed a
project around a post-modern international legal positivism (‘ILP’) as a
contemporary enterprise.97 There remain questions over the extent to
which such a project is post-modern, and can survive the persistent con-
flicts found between the works of its authors, that is between a Hartian
and Kelsenian jurisprudential approach. Here, I consider that there are
some inconsistencies between d’Aspremont’s formalism in FSIL and his
later work on ILP. To be clear, however, source formalism remains at
the masthead of both projects.
This narrow neo-positivist position stands for the following propos-
ition: the validity of an international legal norm is determined solely by
its pedigree, namely, its conformity with the legal system’s sources. This
is the ‘source thesis’. This basic proposition is complemented by two
others. First, the source thesis must ensure that the sources themselves
97 d’Aspremont and Kammerhofer, International Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern World. See
also J Kammerhofer,Uncertainty in International Law: A Kelsenian Perspective (Routledge, London
2010); J Kammerhofer, ‘A Pure Theory of Law and its “Modern” Positivism: International Legal
Uses for Scholarship’, (2012) 106 ASIL Proc 365.
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are formal enough (148) and second, the ‘formal source thesis’ is given
meaning and capable of being determined through the social practice of
law-applying authorities. This latter is a variant of Hart’s ‘social thesis’.
Each is explored in turn.
The sources of international law ought to be stringently formal so as to
reduce indeterminacy. The formal source thesis requires one to reject the
argument that international law’s sources are enshrined in Article 38 of
the ICJ Statute (149-50). d’Aspremont critiques those sources not based
on the written word, for they do not possess the required degree of for-
mality (174). This critique extends to customary international law, the
general principles of law and oral promises made by States. These
sources, d’Aspremont argues, have been ‘relentlessly cloaked . . .with a
veil of formalism’ (15). For d’Aspremont, this collapses the distinctions
between discrete intellectual processes: notably between the making of
and evidence for a legal rule, and between determining the content of and
ascertaining the existence of legal rules (151). These ‘mirages of formal-
ism that shroud the traditional theory of sources and which have allowed
legal scholarship to live in an illusion of relative certainty regarding the
identification of international legal rules’ ought to be exposed and dis-
carded (150). But if the indeterminacy and lack of formality in these
sources is exposed, one is left with making the sources of international
law formal enough to meet the standards of the formal source thesis.
Here, for d’Aspremont, only those sources expressed in the written
word are formal enough to ascertain the existence of legal rules (178).
d’Aspremont’s formal source thesis is a normative project; it makes
claims upon how the law of sources ought to be. This barrier to or re-
quirement of formality functions to counter those approaches that are
likely to deformalize. For example, sources cannot be dependent on the
‘intent of the authors’ (179), unless said intent is translated into grasp-
able material and linguistic indicators (182). Customary international law
and other non-written sources only entrench and proliferate uncertainty
and indeterminacy within international law.98 ‘[O]nly the systemic use of
written linguistic indicators can ensure formal law-ascertainment in
international law’ (186).
d’Aspremont is also only concerned with formality in relation to the
ascertainment of legal norms, and not their creation, content etc. He
understands that ‘both the content [of the norm] and the container [written
instrument, treaty etc.] can potentially serve as a formal signpost that in-
dicates whether the norm in question is an international legal rule’ (175,
original emphasis). But for d’Aspremont formality in the ascertainment
of legal rules lies with ‘the container (instrumentum) of the rule’ (178).
98 J d’Aspremont, ‘International Customary Investment Law: Story of a Paradox’ in E
Brabandere and T Gazzini (eds.), Sources of Transnational Investment Law (Martinus Nijhoff,
The Hague 2012) (making this argument).
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It is here that ‘a distinction between law and non-law must be sought’
(178).
This formal source thesis is made to seem necessary by first exposing
the indeterminacy that runs through both written and non-written
sources. FSIL rails against some of the veils that are induced by formal-
ism, and in doing so takes up the mantel of the legal realist. d’Aspremont
then seeks to stem indeterminacy through the normative claims of his
formalism. This argumentative pattern paints indeterminacy as that
which must be cured, or at least a symptom to be treated or ‘limited’
(148), and formalism as the medicine.
But d’Aspremont also understands that his ‘formal sources thesis’
cannot go far enough in stemming indeterminacy: ‘formalism in law-
ascertainment . . . is not self-sufficient . . . [because it] is shaped through
ordinary language, [and therefore remains] inextricably beset by the in-
determinacy of language if it were not grounded in the social practice of
those applying it.’ (193) The formal source thesis, because of
d’Aspremont’s normative project, requires the social thesis. This
stands for the following proposition: the meaning of sources is derived
from the social practice of identified law-applying authorities within
international law (51-53). The social thesis presumes a specific theory
of language, requires a method for identifying relevant law-applying
authorities, and a method to ascertain the Hartian internal point of
view (itself a social fact).99 These requirements are fulfilled as the
reader is, respectively, thrown into Wittgenstein, Hart and Tamanaha,
and finally an insufficient account of an abstract ‘feeling’. These are the
intellectual tenets of d’Aspremont’s ultimately conservative theory.
Wittgenstein is invoked for the proposition that ‘it is how the word is
used that will teach us the meaning of the word’ (199). The meaning of
words is premised on a communitarian approach to their use. Consensus
and convergence in the practice of language offers and determines mean-
ing (196-200). d’Aspremont states that this does not require absolute
agreement in the use of a word within an a set of law-applying bodies;
complete agreement is ‘probably elusive’ (201). The meaning of formal
sources may be determined with this theory of language. For
d’Aspremont the meaning of formal sources are determined by ‘a
shared feeling of [law-applying authorities] applying the same criteria’
(201-202, original emphasis).
Tamanaha is then used to remedy Hart’s methodological insufficien-
cies in order to answer the question of who are the relevant law-applying
authorities in international law, who determine meaning (17, 203-204).
For d’Aspremont, the relevant law-applying authorities are ‘whomever,
as a matter of social practice, members of the group (including legal
officials themselves) identify and treat as “legal” officials’ (203).100
99 H Hart, The Concept of Law (OUP 1997), 116-117.
100 Quoting, B Tamanaha, A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society (OUP 2001), 142.
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This is an endlessly circular logic: the social practice of law-applying
authorities determines who may be considered as law-applying authori-
ties. These same authorities will then determine the meaning of interna-
tional law’s sources, as well as of those legal rules that determine who are
relevant law-applying authorities. Apart from this self-enclosed logic,
d’Aspremont leaves the reader with only tentative notions of who may
be considered as relevant law-applying authorities, namely, judicial
authorities (domestic and international law), the ICRC and the ILC.
Presuming that such law-applying authorities can be adequately
defined, there must be sufficient convergence in their social practice.
How this convergence is established is the next enquiry. d’Aspremont
assures the reader that the ‘international society . . . is in a position to
produce sufficient communitarian semantics . . . [but] it seems more
questionable whether the current configuration of the international
legal society allows for the emergence of a sustainable feeling of conver-
gence of the practices of law-ascertainment’ (213, original emphasis).
Without sufficient convergence, the social thesis becomes paralysed.
But d’Aspremont ultimately lays the responsibility for such a measure-
ment at the feet of an experiential approach to the international legal
profession. There is the blurring of methodological lines: social scientific
observation, premised on various forms of empiricism, must ultimately
depend on the immeasurable and non-empirical (‘feelings’). This is a
prelude, however, to d’Aspremont’s new normative project. He argues
that the communitarian deficiency in the social consciousness of the
international legal profession can only be remedied by rallying around
a common project and common language (214).
B. The Ideology of Determinacy
d’Aspremont’s FSIL is a recent rendition in the international legal dis-
cipline’s desire to bring closure to the determinacy-indeterminacy
debate, a debate excessive in its hubris, and more importantly, com-
pletely unnecessary. FSIL is a project of ‘disambiguation’ (143); the
formal source and social theses are each aimed at making international
law more determinate (148, 193). The indeterminacy of formal law-as-
certainment criteria ‘is more restricted than what is often asserted’ (141).
And, of course, the ‘international legal order provides at the least the
possibility of a significant social practice which helps stem the indeter-
minacy of law-ascertainment mechanisms that is perpetuated by formal-
ism itself.’ (141). Such academic musings, often in the form of normative
international legal scholarship, feel an ethical imperative to either culti-
vate indeterminacy and/or impose determinacy. This stands true for jur-
isprudential schools ranging from Hart and Dworkin to CLS, realism,
law and economics etc. Working along the axis of this argumentative
trope can bring about new possibilities for international law’s normative
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power, its legitimacy and its authority, or so go such narratives.
However, such positions and debates are marked by an arbitrary and
often untenable dichotomy – between relative determinacy and indeter-
minacy (e.g. 142). Before making this argument, I will first clarify the
different meanings that indeterminacy and determinacy may take.
The Nature of Indeterminacy
The need for clarification arises from my reading of FSIL’s Chapters 4,
6 and 8, as well as of d’Aspremont’s neo-positivist project.101 Upon
reading these works, one can be forgiven for thinking that the indeter-
minacy confronted by d’Aspremont is not identical to the strain
advanced by aspects of CLS, and consequently conclude that his
approach is post-modern. This is not the case: the willingness to make
sources more determinate is a method by which to stem structural
indeterminacy. Given the attention that indeterminacy has received in
jurisprudential debates, it is remarkable that its various manifestations
have not been differentiated. To what object does indeterminacy attach –
legal concepts, rules, discourses, words, arguments or principles?
What type of indeterminacy are specific theories concerned with –
semantic indeterminacy or structural indeterminacy? These ques-
tions will be addressed to the extent they are relevant to
d’Aspremont’s texts.
d’Aspremont’s monograph seems to be concerned with semantic in-
determinacy. It is a distinctly, and unsurprisingly, Hartian variant102
that is concerned with the relative open-endedness of language (139).
It contends that the words or expressions that comprise legal rules
have a ‘core’ meaning and are to this extent relatively determinate, and
equally that such words possess a ‘penumbra of uncertainty’, and are to
some extent indeterminate.103 CLS would disagree with this definition
101 There are two factors that lead to this. First, in several key passages on indeterminacy and the
social thesis, d’Aspremont does not state that he is focusing on semantic indeterminacy (140-141);
the term is used as if it is self-explanatory (141). This would not be problematic given that a Hartian
inference can be reasonably made given d’Aspremont’s thesis, but for d’Aspremont seeking to re-
spond to and engage with the works of Koskenniemi and his critics (this is especially the case in his
neo-positivism project, see d’Aspremont and Kammerhofer, Introduction). Second, d’Aspremont
goes on to assert that he ‘leaves intact some of the objections of the critique inspired by CLS and
deconstruction. In particular, the social thesis, by easing the indeterminacy of the source thesis by
grounding it in social practice, only helps contain indeterminacy at the level of law-ascertainment
but does not purport to allay the contradictions of legal argumentation.’ (218) Does this mean that
d’Aspremont believes that the structural indeterminacy of CLS only attaches to the application of
legal rules and not their ascertainment, and therefore the CLS critique is left intact because it is
irrelevant to d’Aspremont’s project? This reading also emerges from d’Aspremont’s later writings
on neo-positivism (ibid). Or does it mean that the structural thesis is assumed as a critique that is not
challenged in any way by FSIL? Owing to various passages in the book (139), I presume here that
d’Aspremont’s focus is only on tempering semantic indeterminacy and the CLS critique is left fully
intact (i.e. it applies to ascertainment and application of legal rules). The contrary reading is pre-
sumed and critiqued in Singh, Positivism and New Approaches to International Law.
102 Hart, The Concept of Law, 124-136.
103 Ibid, 134.
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of Hartian semantic indeterminacy – take Koskenniemi for example.104
But d’Aspremont does not deal with semantic indeterminacy in its to-
tality, merely a variant of it. By this I mean that he bases his approach to
semantic indeterminacy on a given, if not fully explored, theory of lan-
guage and meaning.
Semantic indeterminacy takes on two different meanings within the
CLS and Hartian traditions, precisely because both are based on very
different theories of language and meaning. Both consider semantic in-
determinacy to be concerned with the meaning of words and concepts,
but they find indeterminacy – or perhaps as a more neutral term, uncer-
tainty – in the meaning of such words through different processes and in
different places. The semantic indeterminacy found in CLS has its roots
in Saussurean structural linguistics.105 This position argues that (legal)
words have no core meaning; there is no meaning intrinsic to the word
itself. Rather meaning emerges through its relationship with other
words, specifically on the ‘formal differences’106 between them. It is in
some senses the polar opposite to the Hartian approach, for meaning
emerges from understanding what a word is not, rather than any onto-
logical understanding of what it is. The common use of a word enables
communication, but it does establish a core meaning for a word. This
theory of language is dominant in structuralist and linguistic approaches
to international law, but its full consequences are not always explored.107
The application of deconstruction as a linguistic theory, in contrast, re-
sults in understanding words and texts as continuously self-generating
objects, in a continuous process of textual production and reproduction –
an ‘infinite relay or meaning from signifier to signified.’108 But what we
see in Kennedy and Koskenniemi, d’Aspremont’s interlocutors, are
works of structuralism. Structural linguistic theories are not concerned
with maintaining, or even obtaining, a conceptual space for determinacy.
It is a theory that argues that indeterminacy permeates both the core and
periphery. In the terminology of, but fundamentally contra Hart, the
meaning of a word is always found in the ‘penumbra’, because this is
all that exists in the spatial metaphor of a word. Meaning is utterly im-
permanent, when considered relative to a Hartian approach.
d’Aspremont does little to acknowledge that his understanding of
semantic indeterminacy requires a specific theory of language and mean-
ing. This is understandable: one cannot be expected to defend each epis-
temological position taken. His claim that semantic indeterminacy can be
104 See his notions of semantic indeterminacy in M Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The
Structure of International Legal Argument (Reissue with a New Epilogue) (CUP 2005), 590-3.
105 F Saussure, General Course in Linguistics (R Harris (tr.), Open Court, Chicago 1983), 65 et
seq.
106 Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, 9.
107 E MacDonald, International Law and Ethics After the Critical Challenge: Framing the Legal
within the Post-Foundational (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 2011), 59-63 (critiquing Koskenniemi for
not taking seriously enough the effects of Saussurean linguistics for his own project).
108 F Jameson, The Prison-House of Language (Princeton University Press 1972), 182.
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stemmed or tempered, through the social sources thesis, does however
depend on accepting and presuming his linguistic theory. But if we ac-
knowledge that there are other forms of semantic indeterminacy, then we
understand d’Aspremont’s choice as entirely arbitrary. To think of
words as having a core, determined by unified social practice, rather
than rejecting such a core and thinking of them as the result of a con-
stantly shifting structure based on irreconcilable but mutually dependent
contradictions, is arbitrary. This choice cannot be made by recourse to
independent criteria or criteria common to both linguistic theory. His
choice of linguistic theory in turn determines how he looks at the lin-
guistic and social practices of international law; his empiricism looks to
establish convergence in social practice precisely because this is what his
linguistic theory demands.
This acknowledgement leaves the reader in the curious position of
knowing that d’Aspremont’s attempt to stem his variant of semantic
indeterminacy is part and parcel of a larger structural indeterminacy
critique. Let me explain. The first point of note is that working towards
determinacy in one discourse (international law) only throws us into the
very real structural indeterminacy of another discourse (linguistics).
Structural indeterminacy knows very well that no discourse is determin-
ate. This first step is hidden from view. Rather, d’Aspremont needs his
thesis to be perceived as resting on solid, verifiable foundations. The
image of determinacy in international law, and the process of working
towards it, requires the appearance of determinate epistemological under-
pinnings. These are found, for Hartian theorists and d’Aspremont, in the
empirical promises of inter-subjective findings in social practice data.
Finally, indeterminacy is interminable in the abstract. And every theory
always has an abstracted premise. Determinations, in practice, do not end
indeterminacy but highlight the contingencies and politics of choice. The
solid epistemological foundations to combat linguistic indeterminacy only
open the door to the structural indeterminacy of another discourse. One
cannot but slide from one discourse into another, the last being no more
determinate than the next. Any and all claims to a greater determinacy (in
international law or elsewhere) is structured by the interminability of this
process.
All of this is to say that there is nothing necessary in d’Aspremont’s or
Hart’s approach to semantic indeterminacy; structural indeterminacy not
only highlights the contingency of the conceptual choice taken, but also
how the aesthetic that one is seeking in one discourse is always seemingly
found in another. Determinacy is an idea and aesthetic that will always
arrest the potential slippages of structural indeterminacy in highly pre-
dictable ways.
Given Foundations of Determinacy
A point that emerged from the previous section is how determinacy and
indeterminacy are constructed concepts; their meanings alter and can be
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manipulated by certain choices in theory. This observation is of import,
because they are conceptual categories used to structure our experience
of the world. A significant aspect of d’Aspremont’s thesis is to make
claims about the foundations of both determinacy and indeterminacy,
as well as about their relative benefits for international law. For
d’Aspremont, clearer, more determinate rules increases law’s authority,
its normativity, its legitimacy, and ultimately its efficacy (29-32, 140-
145). This complex cocktail of conceptual entailments are all claims to
improvement. I have already spoken of the link between determinacy
and coherence, but I think the manner in which d’Aspremont valorises
its relationship to greater authority, normative and efficacy, is
overstated.
International law’s ‘normativity’, ‘legitimacy’ and ‘efficacy’ are each
complex, multifaceted concepts. Their relationship to determinacy, i.e.
greater determinacy means greater returns for such concepts, is arguably
being simplified. This reductionism will be taken up here.
The starting point for analysis is acknowledging that the sources doc-
trine plays a number of different roles within international law. These
roles may be performed in tension with each other, and each such role
makes different claims of influence on the normativity of international
law.109 One such role is to govern the creation of norms.110 A second role
is the ability of sources to generate ascertainment criteria that may con-
tinuously incorporate contemporary law-making practices. The claim to
new sources must, normally, be shoehorned into traditional conceptions.
A third role, dominant throughout FSIL, is to determine what is law and
what is not. Each of these various roles are equally necessary to the
discipline’s legitimacy, efficacy and indeed, continuity. But the first
two roles require an appreciation of indeterminacy and a not so strin-
gently formalized approach to sources doctrine marked by a respect for
loose abstract categories. The silent engine of international law is
custom, and it functions in precisely this way, but d’Aspremont would
have us do away with it. The legitimacy of the discipline and its efficacy,
and perhaps at times its normative pull, is often sustained through in-
creasingly indeterminate and a not-so-formal sources doctrine; the ap-
pearance of formality, the myth, is a necessary, indeed indispensible,
requirement for the discipline.
109 Koskenniemi’s definition of his indeterminacy ought to be born in mind when considering the
various reasons and roles of the sources doctrine in this paragraph: ‘And because no rule is more
important than the reason for which it is enacted, even the most unambiguous rule is infected by the
disagreements that concern how that reason is to be understood and how it ranks with competing
ones’ Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, 591.
110 R Jennings, ‘What is International Law and How do we Tell it when we See it’, (1980) 37
Annuaire Suisse de Droit International 59, 60 (‘It should be remembered at the outset that in
considering the sources of international law, we are looking not only at the test of validity of
law – the touchstone of what is law and what it is not – but also at the ways in which law is made
and changed.’)
335FORMALISM’S RECURRENT RETURN
 by guest on D
ecem
ber 6, 2014
http://bybil.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
The problem is with d’Aspremont’s argumentative trope, in particular
the predisposition to having an adversary and needing to overcome it.
Determinacy and indeterminacy are for him conceptual opposites. They
ought also to be regarded as rhetorical strategies. Their functions and
prospects depend on which of the various roles the sources doctrine is set
to perform. The point here is that these opposing sensibilities are both
required: the narrative ought not to be the triumph or definitive prefer-
ence of one over the other, but rather an appreciation that their persistent
contradiction and tension is central to, and possibly a requisite for, inter-
national law’s normativity, legitimacy and efficacy.
C. Comments on Method: Ideological Arrests of the Social Thesis
The task now is to highlight how d’Aspremont’s primary thesis is rife
with some persistent, and at times irreconcilable, tensions. Some of these
are accepted and he works dialectically, some of these are denied, and
some of these are hidden from view due to the FSIL’s narrative tropes. I
explore these to expose the ideological dimensions that lie at the edges of
d’Aspremont’s FSIL. The ‘strategies of containment’ that he employs
are laid bare.
Take for instance the competing epistemologies that d’Aspremont
premises his formalism upon. On the one hand his formal source
thesis finds the legal essence of sources in the ‘container’ of such rules;
they are valorised as rules through a formality that is only found in this
essence.111 On the other hand, his social thesis sees sources as fact, where
rules are determined by social practice (or feeling). One is premised on
an epistemology of philosophical idealism and the other on realism.112
These have long been conflicting traditions of thought that are often
mirrored throughout social theory and international legal thought.
Even at the level of epistemology we see operations of structural inde-
terminacy.113 FSIL artificially arrests this indeterminacy with a circular
logic (195).114
111 In contrast to Hart’s own sources thesis, d’Aspremont’s source thesis is normative – it seeks to
make source rules more formal than they are, see Hart, The Concept of Law, 129-130.
112 T Nagel, ‘Subjective and Objective’ in J Rajchman and C West (eds.), Post-Analytic
Philosophy (Columbia University Press 1985) 31, 38-46.
113 For an overview of these considerations see Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, 516-521.
114 It should be noted that d’Aspremont’s social thesis plays both a normative and descriptive
role in his projects. A separate critique can be made that the normative element of his social thesis
(as outlined in FSIL) undermines the descriptive functioning of the source thesis in his neo-posi-
tivist project in ILP. In FSIL, the social thesis is distinctly normative, in that it is used solely as a
method to make more formal sources, more determinate (192-194, 197, 213). In ILP, however,
d’Aspremont’s neo-positivist project uses the social thesis in a purely descriptive manner. It is used
to determine what the law is, buttressing the central positivist proposition that what the law is, is in
no way dependent on what the law should be. Determinacy is not imposed, but rather uncovered.
The normative social source thesis found in FSIL runs contrary to the tenets of d’Aspremont’s later
neo-positivist argument. This is further explored in Singh, Positivism and New Approaches to
International Law.
336 NARRATIVE AND THEORY
 by guest on D
ecem
ber 6, 2014
http://bybil.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
The second epistemological tension that seems to run through FSIL’s
conceptual framework is between “objective” and “subjective” realism.
d’Aspremont’s theory of language, as used in his social thesis, favours the
former. But he ultimately rests the same thesis on a ‘shared feeling of
applying the same [law-ascertainment] criteria’ (201) among law-apply-
ing authorities; and approach that favours the latter. The concern is that
once these competing theoretical and epistemological bases are taken
seriously, and meshed together, as d’Aspremont does in his social
thesis, they can only destabilise each other’s foundations. Let me
explain.
Relying on a specific theory of language, d’Aspremont argues that ‘the
meaning of formal law-ascertainment criteria arises out of their conver-
gence in use’ (197, original emphasis). Following Wittgenstein he states
‘clarification of the meaning of words . . . is all about how the participants
in human activities conduct such a clarification . . . [i]t is how the word I
used that will teach us the meaning of the word’ (198-199). If meaning
rests on use, and a specific intersubjective communitarian use, it must
rest on expression. To determine use and expression, d’Aspremont has
to have recourse, according to this same theory of language, to ‘the prac-
tice of law-applying authorities’ (199, emphasis added). Of course there
cannot be absolute consistency in practice, merely coherence. To exam-
ine practice is to undertake an “objective” inquiry; it is distinctly empir-
ical, measurable and appreciates the intricacies of sociological inquiry.
However, d’Aspremont then makes another move:
Yet, concurring with Wittgenstein and subsequently, Hart and rejecting
Dworkin’s semantic sting objection, I argue that the social foundation of for-
malism in the ascertainment of international legal rules does not call for actual,
total, and absolute agreement among law-applying authorities. It essentially
requires a shared feeling of applying the same criteria . . . such a feeling will ne-
cessarily hinge on their respective understandings of formal law-ascertainment
criteria dovetailing to a reasonable extent. (201, original emphasis, footnotes
omitted)115
The “objective” empiricism that we initially see form the basis of his
social thesis is replaced by the abstract and effectively immeasurable and
abstracted requirement of feeling. What we see in the phenomenological
turn is an epistemology premised on a Humean “subjective” realism.
And even in this turn, d’Aspremont deprives us of any conceptual
tools with which to order the experiences and feelings of others, without
which this sensory world is reduced to chaos. The creeping, but
115 It is curious that d’Aspremont cites Raz in this regard (205, footnote 37 and 213, footnote 88),
because whilst his work – and d’Aspremont’s particular citations of it – considers the possibility for
disagreement in the actual use of concepts just as Hart does (and even disagreements about the
criteria of application of concepts), he does not seek to bind possible deviations by recourse to some
common feeling that disagreeing law-applying authorities may have over their application of a
concept.
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persistent, concern arising from this observation is precisely the same
that MacIntyre had of Hume: sense-empiricism leads ‘not to sophistica-
tion, but to regression.’116
The social thesis is then held together by two conflicting epistemolo-
gies, i.e. by two very different understanding of how we can know the
international legal world. One presumes that facts can be found in the
practice of the social world, and the other rests on our senses, our feel-
ings, of what is in the social world. But how can the latter be shown to
actually exist in the social world, and how can they be shown to be
shared? And how can former, practice-facts, be shown to exist in our
phenomenological world?
The concern is that the social thesis is stretched in opposing direc-
tions. If d’Aspremont is loyal to his theory of language and the empirical
realism that emerges from it, then he is only able to speak of the shared
feelings of law-applying authorities to the extent that these same agents
express them in one form or another. It is only upon expression, hence
use, that these feelings will have sufficient linguistic or material indica-
tors. On the other hand, if d’Aspremont is loyal to his requirement that
the social thesis be determined by appreciating shared feelings, he must
abandon his initial theory of language. The phenomenological inquiry
requires looking beyond the surface of a word’s use and rather insists on
looking behind it – what was it intended to mean. This would mean
appreciating that a ‘linguistic product is not only a socially and histor-
ically situated construction which displays an articulated structure, but is
also an expression that claims to say something about something; and it is
this claim, understood in terms of what is asserted by an expression and
what that expression is about, which must be grasped by interpret-
ation.’117 An inquiry into feelings requires a hermeneutic approach to
language: an appreciation of ‘what is being said in what was said’,118
what is not said, and what is created in what is said. An analysis of the
mere use of words to determine meaning comes to seem superficial and
masks the work of ideology.
d’Aspremont’s methodology seems to be caught between a rock and a
hard place, but this inescapable tension is not opened up to the reader.
It is out of reliance on various dialectics that d’Aspremont is able to
construct a conceptually coherent vision. And yet this is a coherence
that tends to delude, for it contains at its edges precisely the same
conceptual schemas that render it simultaneously contingent and
necessary.
This leads me to a third remark on the method of d’Aspremont’s social
thesis. He has almost moved entirely away from Hart, by premising this
thesis as dependent on a ‘shared feeling among law-applying
116 MacIntyre, ‘Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narratives and the Philosophy of Science’, 14.
117 J Thompson, ‘Language and Ideology: A Framework for Analysis’, (1987) 35 The
Sociological Review 516, 520-521 (underlined emphasis added, italicized emphasis in original).
118 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 30 (although he rails against such an inquiry).
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authorities’.119 This eventually leads him to scupper the possibility of
identifying criteria of law-ascertainment because:
Whilst . . . international society, in spite of its limited institutionalization, is in a
position to produce sufficient communitarian semantic for the sake of the social
thesis, it seems more questionable whether the current configuration of the
international legal society allows the emergence of a sustainable feeling of con-
vergence of the practices of law-ascertainment. Indeed, as explained above, for
communitarian semantics to be generated, the mere existence of practice is in-
sufficient. What is needed is a sense by the abovementioned actors that they are
using the same criteria and thus the sense that they belong to the same linguistic
community. . . . the problem is thus not really the fragmentation of the produc-
tion of the social practice but rather the absence of social consciousness among
the variety of actors contributing to the production of communitarian semantics.
(213, original emphasis, footnotes omitted)
d’Aspremont uses very different experiential notions, whilst assigning
them the same function: ‘consciousness’, ‘feeling’ and ‘sense’.120 This
lack is exacerbated because they do an awful lot of legwork. If a shared
feeling exists, international law’s criteria for law-ascertainment (or
Hart’s rule of recognition (195)) may be identified. But the lack of def-
inition, or criteria of application, becomes even more problematic with-
out any concepts, images, aesthetics or ideas through which they may
function to represent the international legal world they seek to represent.
As Husserl well knew, without such a methodological apparatus there
really is no way to know if a ‘feeling’ has any connection with the social
world beyond an internalised experience.121 It is not denied that the
‘meaning’ that d’Aspremont requires to ‘plug’ his social thesis can be
conveyed by non-linguistic indicators such as feelings, images etc. But in
d’Aspremont’s FSIL there is no method provided to grasp the
119 An ungenerous reading of FSIL (precisely because d’Aspremont calls it a Hartian thesis) may
argue that he has misread and misapplied Hart. For Hart and for Raz, there may be disagreement
and deviations from the application and use of the rule of recognition (what d’Aspremont terms
‘law-ascertainment criteria’). From the internal point of view, this rule of recognition is determined
by the acceptance and use of its standards by officials of the legal system. The idea that there is a
shared feeling as to what a particular rule is, does not come into the equation; the internal point of
view is not dependent on shared feelings of obedience for officials (Hart explicitly rejects this),
rather it is dependent on their practice of acceptance and use. Any perceived deviation, due to
confusion in meaning, does not negate the practice, because coherence does specific reductive
work. Determination of whether the rule of recognition is a common standard amongst legal officials
is determined by their practice. See specifically, Hart, The Concept of Law, 89-90, 115-117; J Raz,
‘The Nature and Theory of Law’ in J Coleman (ed.), Hart’s Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to
‘The Concept of Law’ (Oxford, 2001) 1, 18-20; contra d’Aspremont’s argument in FSIL at 53-55,
201. See also note 116 above.
120 d’Aspremont speaks of the absence of ‘social consciousness’ to arguably assert that actors are
not aware of their social contribution, but we are not always aware or conscious of everything that is
going on around us, let alone in the most habitual of activities. ‘Feeling’ is arguably broader than
consciousness, in that we may not always be aware of its full dimension, in that is may be both a
conscious and semi-conscious activity. These distinctions, amongst numerous others, are extremely
important, but unexplored by d’Aspremont.
121 See, E Husserl, Logical Investigations (D Moran (ed.), J Findlay (tr.), Routledge, New York
2001).
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production of this meaning. Does coherence continue to run from the
structure of the text, to its aesthetics, to aspects of its practice-based
social thesis, all the way to conceptually delineating ‘feeling’? Even it
did so, it would not go far enough; ‘feeling’ is left absent of the condi-
tions of its application.122 In this sense, it is not operationalized123 in a
manner that does justice to the methodological requirements of the ana-
lytical philosophy and jurisprudential traditions that d’Aspremont seeks
to follow. The noteworthy point, however, is that d’Aspremont’s text
and thesis cannot function if his concept of ‘shared feeling’ is operatio-
nalized. An intellectual arrest has been performed so that the reader can
have the appearance of a ‘ground’ – a foundation upon which to build
greater relative determinacy in the sources of international law. If given
specificity and the conditions of its application, we would likely see that
there are only complex gaps, paradoxes and conflicts in the ‘feelings’ of
law-appliers. The given foundation would, so to speak, begin to shake.
Pierre Schlag has called such concepts ‘theoretical unmentionables’.
These are ‘those items within a theory which, by virtue of the identity
of the theory, one can say very little about, but which are absolutely
necessary for the theory to do its work.’ They look ‘as if [they have]
substance and content – and yet [remain] sufficiently empty that [they]
can perform any work required to defend the theory.’124 The point to be
made is that d’Aspremont’s ‘shared feeling’ is only a rhetorical trick that
pushes his political search for foundations behind the veneer of an appar-
ently graspable theoretical concept. Intellectual arrests perform impor-
tant rhetorical tasks in any theory. And, yet, you will also see that
d’Aspremont’s enquiry is artificially arrested in other respects.
In the quote above, we also see d’Aspremont claim that material rea-
lities do not undo the social thesis; ‘the problem is thus not really the
fragmentation of the production of social practice but rather the absence
of social consciousness’ (213). What would seem to be required is a
change in self-aware thinking (consciousness) and shared feeling of the
relevant international legal actors. This position couldn’t be any more
problematic from a Marxist perspective: ‘legal relations . . . are to be
grasped neither from themselves nor from the so-called general devel-
opment of the human mind, but have their roots in the material condi-
tions of life . . . It is not the consciousness of men that determines their
being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their
122 For an example of how one can flesh out an experiential concept see Winter, A Clearing in the
Forest (though he concentrates on imagination). This follows a long line of thinking from Gilbert
Ryle onwards, see G Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Hutchinson University Library, London 1949)
104-107 (on feelings).
123 It is important to note that this I do not use ‘operationalized’ in the same sense that Herbert
Marcuse used it for concepts, see H Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of
Advanced Industrial Society (D Kellner (int.), Routledge, London 2nd edn. 1991) 107-111.
124 Schlag, The Enchantment of Reason, 112-113; P Schlag, ‘Contradiction and Denial’, (1989)
87 Michigan Law Review 1216.
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consciousness.’125 I do not assert that d’Aspremont ought to be more of
an intellectual Marxist, nor even that Marx’s insight has to be right.
More simply, I argue that d’Aspremont does not take seriously insights
he later made in a 2012 editorial. This has specific consequences for his
methodology. There he was concerned with the international legal schol-
arship and not law-applying authorities,126 but he made two points of
relevance to both social systems.
First, the use of language is ‘informed by the current structure (and
membership) of the interpretive community of international law’,127 it
‘unfolds not in a social vacuum, but rather against the backdrop of a
well-organized social system.’128 Such a social system provides ‘the
protocols and constraints that shape the competition for naming,’129
but is also shaped by ‘funding made available’ and its ‘labour
market’.130 Second, d’Aspremont states that the use of language is
about ‘the struggle for interpretive authority and persuasiveness’,131
and this may at points rise to the level of the ‘structural inevitability
of . . . interpretive competition . . . a fact of life inherent in a commu-
nity.’132 But d’Aspremont was equally adamant that this observation
and its application to the practice of law-applying authorities would
not ‘lead to a total rejection of the internal point of view . . . [and that
it] does not necessarily entail an abandonment of internal determinants
of legality.’133
The ruptures and contradictions in d’Aspremont’s thought between
FSIL and his 2012 editorial are countless – from a near complete shift in
intellectual and methodological lineages, to a shift from romantic-comic
disposition to that of pragmatic cynicism, to another shift from his scep-
ticism of the social thesis in FSIL to his ardent defence of it a year later.
But the numerous ruptures and contradictions are useful if only to high-
light the series of strategic arrests in his FSILmethod. Each of the stated
observations in the previous paragraph have the same specific conse-
quence: they require d’Aspremont to reject his own contention that
‘the problem is thus not really the fragmentation of the production of
social practice but rather the absence of social consciousness’ (213). If
language is produced and received in specific social conditions, it ought
to be clear that the same is true of thoughts and feelings. To an extent
125 K Marx, ‘Preface to a Critique of Political Economy’ in K Marx, Karl Marx: Selected
Writings (D McLeilan (ed.), OUP, 2nd edn. 2000) 424, 425.
126 d’Aspremont, Wording, 578, 582-584 (‘The social constraints that hinder the moves of inter-
national legal scholars are too different from those of international judges. This is both the cause and
consequence of the fact that they belong to two different – albeit intertwined – subgroups of the
interpretive community of international law.’ Ibid, 584)
127 Ibid, 577.
128 Ibid, 585.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid, 588.
131 Ibid, 582.
132 Ibid, 598.
133 Ibid, 583 (footnotes omitted).
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Marx’s observations hold true (the term ‘determined’ is perhaps an over-
statement of the case). The problem for the social thesis is therefore one
of both social practice and absence of a shared feeling, or social con-
sciousness. This elementary observation is complemented by another.
If in a fragmented social context (such as international legal scholarship
and academia), we find structural conflict, competition and struggle for
authority in the use of language, then the potential areas of intersubject-
ivity and community are greatly diminished. To be sure the structural
conditions of international law-applying institutions may be different,
but one can agree that their fragmented nature has led to linguistic
and symbolic competition.134 The point is simply that this has the in-
herent potential to defeat the viability of the social thesis:135 ‘the frag-
mentation of the production of social practice’ has to be, contra
d’Aspremont, an essential part of the problem.
The pressing concern I have is that d’Aspremont’s method is arrested
at the precise points at which it could potentially question or, more im-
portantly, undermine or subvert the text’s and his thesis’ functional ob-
jective of determinacy, and to appropriately grasp its usefulness. He
adopts a theory of language that is teleologically premised on determin-
acy to argue that the meaning of words is premised on a communitarian
approach to their use. But at the precise point where he is unsure that
sufficient convergence or agreement amongst law-applying authorities
may exist (arrest 1), he introduces the notion of ‘shared feeling’ amongst
the same actors. He then doesn’t assess this concept in terms of its con-
tent, objectives or its ‘values’, or outline the criteria for its application
(arrest 2). The initial empirical inquiry into practice (through language)
was near-abandoned, supplemented and supervened by an abstract con-
dition of measurement for his social thesis (‘feeling’). This latter inquiry
is not followed into an empirical enquiry along phenomenological lines
(arrest 3); and it is elevated precisely so he does not have to confront
those material conditions that would almost certainly defeat, and defin-
itely threaten, his social thesis (as initially premised on practice, i.e. the
fragmentation of the production of such practice) (arrest 4). These ‘ar-
rests’ are methodological injunctions that impose FSIL’s strategies of
containment. This is no more or less than an ideology that must privilege
the status quo, that vision of the world that it sees as ‘is’. It will exclude
or arrest each enquiry that questions its own conditions of possibility. To
the limited extent that there are breaches that it engages its own limits,
and even its own impossibility, it will still continue to sustain an
134 M Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law – 20 Years On’, (2009) 20 EJIL 7, 11-12
(understanding that linguistic competition is endemic to a fragmented legal order).
135 See e.g. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, 569-570, 600-615 (his notion of structural
bias presumes a degree of intersubjectivity at an institutional level: ‘there is a structural bias in the
relevant legal institutions that makes them serve typical, deeply embedded preferences’ (ibid, 607),
though he leaves open the question of whether this is possible across the whole range of international
law-applying authorities).
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unwavering belief in its own possibility.136 After all, its functionalism
requires this form of therapy.
V. CONCLUSION
This, evidently, is not a review in the traditional sense. It advocates a
new method in international legal thinking, narrative analysis, and
applies it to d’Aspremont’s FSIL. But while the analysis seeks to
remain loyal to d’Aspremont’s texts, it aims to highlight its ruptures
and its breaks. The very dissociative aesthetic that narrative analysis
employs strongly contrasts with the ordered and coherent aesthetic
that conditions d’Aspremont’s narrative. The purpose is to show how
a theory employs subtle and not-so-subtle strategies, tactics and sensi-
bilities and how such aspects of a theory are emotively, intellectually and
socially conditioned. It has been demonstrated how dangerous and irre-
sponsible it is to only grasp theories as method for this ignores some of
the intricacies of how they work on us and through us. To appreciate
them with any degree of reflexivity, it is suggested that at the very least
they ought to be grasped and comprehended as narratives. Narrative
analysis leads us into the intimate connection between ideas, imagination
and action, for the very simple reason that narrative may help capture the
complex nature of theorising. I hope narrative analysis will allow us to
appreciate that a legal theory is part method, part aesthetics, and part
ideology; and most importantly, that it is in each of these parts and the
sum of its whole, always historical.
Beyond this abstraction, this article has been about d’Aspremont’s
FSIL, and more broadly, the logic of a returned formalism in
European international legal thinking. It has been an engagement with
the work of a fine, if evolving, theorist in international law. It is perhaps
simplistic to say that FSIL ought to be essential reading for all those
interested in contemporary international legal theory. For those with
knowledge of the terrain, it is a book whose content will be familiar;
much like seeing an old friend after not so many years, with a little
cosmetic work fitting of the times. This is a book that seeks to reintro-
duce the old into the new: a neo-positivism or formalism for a post-
modern world. But it is a book that, in many respects, is on the offensive:
why a formalist offensive is necessary, what it means for the discipline,
and how it is effectuated, are all questions that are addressed in
d’Aspremont’s project.
136 See e.g. d’Aspremont, Wording, 599-601, especially 600.
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